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Groundwater resources in the Intermountain West (Colorado, Montana, New 
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) continue to dwindle while populations expand. Oil and 
natural gas production in the region continues to increase, with a corresponding increase 
in production waste (mostly water). In the 1950s, each state set up an oil and gas 
conservation commission to regulate the disposal of the relatively small amounts of 
highly saline water produced during conventional oil and gas extraction. Beginning in the 
1980s, however, energy producers began extracting methane trapped in coal seams that 
were too deep to mine conventionally. Today, this coalbed methane comprises nearly 
10% of total domestic natural gas production. In order to extract coalbed methane, large 
quantities of water—often high-quality water—must be removed and disposed. That 
water does not fit into the regulatory scheme of byproduct waste to be governed solely by 
state oil and gas conservation commissions, nor is it extracted and used in the same 
manner as traditional groundwater resources subject to state groundwater laws. This 
paper examines Colorado’s recent shift from the byproduct waste model to a groundwater 
resource model and proposes specific legislative changes that would recognize coalbed 
methane produced water as a unique resource. Those changes would help slow the waste 
of high-quality groundwater resources without unduly burdening energy producers, and 
would encourage treatment and traditional uses of the water. Colorado’s approach may 
then serve as a template for other states in the region who are attempting to meet their 






Methane (commonly called natural gas) trapped in coal seams historically was 
viewed as a waste product that had to be removed prior to mining, but as energy supplies 
dwindle, this resource has become increasingly important. In order to extract coalbed 
methane (CBM), large volumes of water must be pumped from coal seams and disposed. 
At a time when water demand in western states is rising beyond available supply, an 
effective regulatory framework for the water involved in CBM extraction is crucial to 
meeting the region’s current and future needs.1 Currently, regulation is based on a 
complex and inefficient system set up in the 1950s to deal with traditional oil and gas 
waste disposal.2 Although much of the CBM produced water approaches drinking water 
quality standards, most is wasted through surface dumping or pumped deep underground 
into highly saline aquifers. This paper examines the historical and developing legal trends 
in the industry. Colorado is used as a representative state to examine the shift from oil 
and gas commission regulation (as in New Mexico, Utah, and Montana) to concurrent 
regulation by the State Engineer (as in Wyoming) after the Vance v. Simpson decision.3 
This paper posits that recent legal, scientific, and technological developments may 
                                                 
1 The “More Water, More Energy, and Less Waste Act of 2007” as passed by the House and currently on 
the Senate Calendar states that “[the] development of energy resources, including . . . coalbed methane . . . 
frequently results in bringing to the surface water extracted from underground sources; . . .most of the 
water is returned to the subsurface or otherwise disposed of as waste . . . . [I]t is in the national interest . . . 
to limit the quantity of produced water disposed of as waste; . . . and to remove or reduce obstacles to use 
of produced water for irrigation or other purposes . . . .” S. 1116, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007). 
2 The need for a legislative solution was the subject of a recent Denver Post Editorial, which stated that the 
“water problem seems to have taken the five Rocky Mountain states by surprise. It's high time their 
legislatures clarified their state laws . . . to protect the economy, environment and agriculture of the Rocky 
Mountain West.” Denver Post Editorial Board, Rocky Mountain States Drop Ball on Water Rules, DEN. 
POST, August 17, 2007, available at http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_6643530. 
3No. 2005CW063 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 7, July 2, 2007). In any case, Colorado is likely to pass 
legislation on the subject soon. Email from Sen. Greg Brophy, Colo. Dist. 1, to author (Nov. 30, 2007 
15:01:00 EST) (on file with author). 
3 
encourage an alternate disposal system for this “byproduct” water focused on treatment 
and beneficial use rather than disposal by injection into deep wells or surface dumping. 
Minor legislative changes could codify these developments and better conform to market 
forces, encourage new technology, and protect the interests of current and future residents 
of the region. 
Part I of this paper introduces how coalbed methane is formed and the location of 
major reserves in the intermountain west, including an overview of resource quantity, 
depth, water quality, and extraction techniques. The current controversy over whether 
CBM dewatering constitutes “beneficial use” is outlined. Each state in the region follows 
the prior appropriation doctrine, but Montana, New Mexico, and Utah have determined 
that CBM dewatering is not a “beneficial use” of water and thus exclude it from the 
appropriation system. Wyoming is the only state that recognizes CBM dewatering as a 
“beneficial use.” Colorado’s move to find CBM dewatering a “beneficial use” is 
examined through the July 2007 Durango Water Court ruling in Vance v. Simpson.4  
Finally, current disposal methods are outlined and evaluated based on their long term 
sustainability.  
Part II sets out the regulatory background in for oil, gas, and groundwater 
extraction. Colorado’s approach (before Vance) is outlined, including the responsible 
state agencies and the specific regulations dealing with produced water disposal and 
groundwater appropriation. As a byproduct waste, most CBM produced water falls under 
the sole jurisdiction of the oil and gas conservation commissions. This model treats 
relatively high quality water as a “waste,” similar to the low quality brine associated with 
conventional oil and gas extraction which may be up to eleven times saltier than 
                                                 
4 Id. 
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seawater.  In Wyoming and in Colorado after Vance, removing the water is an 
appropriation that invokes the jurisdiction of the State Engineer. In Colorado, this may 
cause jurisdictional problems between the oil and gas conservation commission and the 
State Engineer. The Wellington oilfield project, where oil producers treat produced water 
in order to augment municipal drinking water supplies is discussed to highlight current 
deficiencies in Colorado’s regulatory scheme. Finally, Wyoming and New Mexico’s 
approach to CBM produced water management are shown. Specific solutions adopted by 
each state are applicable to Colorado, but neither state has fully addressed the problem. 
Part III examines CBM development and regulation in terms of economic and 
technologic feasibility. Stringent produced water regulations restrict resource 
development and may decrease royalty and tax collection. This may impact local 
communities and may discourage certain technological advances. However, many of 
these impacts are mitigated as gas prices rise and more resources become economically 
recoverable. Constant legislative changes and schemes that involve long permitting 
timeframes also have a direct economic impact on produced water disposal options, 
precluding the most desirable choice. Part III also examines the benefits of produced 
water regulation. Much like oil and gas reserves, high-quality groundwater is an 
increasingly valuable and finite resource in the west. Stringent regulation slows 
withdrawal and waste of groundwater resources, which in the future may become even 
more valuable than its associated natural gas. However, forcing producers to fully 
internalize the costs of wasting groundwater may be economically and technologically 
infeasible. 
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Part IV introduces a proposed legislative solution for Colorado that would codify 
the Vance decision, legislatively stating that CBM dewatering is beneficial use, but 
introducing a distinction between produced water from deep, saline aquifers (which 
resembles conventional oil and gas waste) and produced water from shallow, high quality 
aquifers (which resembles surface water). Setting a depth/water quality threshold would 
recognize that some of the produced water can and should be beneficially used, while 
much is of such low quality that “waste” regulations are more appropriate. This 
distinction would strike the appropriate balance between gas extraction and water 
resource preservation, and would protect existing water rights. Subjecting CBM operators 
to the jurisdiction of the State Engineer would prevent waste of this increasingly valuable 
resource, and may serve as a model for other states in the region. 
 
I. CBM PRODUCTION AND EXTRACTION 
 
Coal seams are found in thirty-eight states, and nearly one-eighth of the country lies 
over coalbeds.5 However, 90% of these deposits are unmineable.6 All coal seams contain 
some amount of natural gas, or methane, which historically was viewed as a mine safety 
hazard,7 but now represents more than 9.6% of total domestic natural gas production.8 
                                                 
5 American Coal Foundation: FAQs about coal, http://www.teachcoal.org/aboutcoal/articles/faqs.html. 
6 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Policy Facts: Coalbed Natural Gas (Feb. 2005) available at 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/factsheets/policy/Policy019.pdf. 
7 The worst mine disaster in American history, the 1907 Fairmont Coal Methane Explosion near Monogah, 
West Virginia, killed over 362 miners. Coalbed methane is also a current danger – of the 197 fatalities in 
underground coal mines in the United States from August 1980 to August 2007, 104 were due to coalbed 
methane explosions. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Mining Disasters - An Exhibition: 1907 Fairmont Coal Company 
Mining Disaster Monongah, West Virginia,  http://www.msha.gov/disaster/monongah/monon1.asp; U.S. 
Mine Rescue Ass’n, Fatalities Occurring at Underground Coal Mine Disasters Since 1980, 
http://www.usmra.com/disasters_80on.htm. 
6 
Unlike traditional coal mining, coalbed methane is produced by drilling and dewatering 
unmineable coal seams to allow the methane to escape. Due to the nature of coal 
deposition and depth compared to traditional oil and gas reserves, the water produced in 
CBM extraction is generally of much higher quality than that produced in traditional oil 
and gas production. Because of its relatively high quality, CBM water is often discharged 
onto the surface and may be used for irrigation, stock watering, or other uses with little or 
no treatment, unlike produced water waste from traditional oil and gas extraction which 
generally injected underground into deep, highly saline formations. 
 
A. Formation and Location of Reserves in the Intermountain West 
 
Coal formation and consolidation produces large amounts of methane over time.9 
Instead of escaping, the methane binds (adsorbs) to coal surfaces. The microstructure of 
coal provides tremendous surface area for gas adsorption: one ton of coal contains 200 
million to 2 trillion square feet of surface area,10 can yield up to 8,000 cubic feet of 
methane gas,11 and typically contains six to seven times the gas of an equivalent mass of 
rock in a conventional gas reservoir.12 Unlike coals in the Eastern United States (which 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Total domestic CBM production in 2005 was 1.732 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas while total domestic 
natural gas production was 18.051 Tcf. U.S. Energy Information Administration  Natural Gas Navigator, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/info_glance/natural_gas.html [hereinafter EIA]. 
9 Id. 
10 Scott Reeves, Enhanced Coalbed Methane Recovery, (2003) (Presentation at the Soc. of Petroleum Eng. 
Distinguished Lecture Series) available at http://www.adv-res.com/pdf/Reeves%20DL%20Presentation.pdf 
11 Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Comm’n and ALL Consulting, A Guide to Practical Management of 
Produced Water from Onshore Oil and Gas Operations in the United States (Prepared for the 
U.S. Dep’t of Energy Nat’l Petroleum Technology Office) (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter ALL 2006] at 6, 
available at http://www.all-llc.com/IOGCC/PDF/PWGuideFinal-LowRes.pdf. 
12 U.S. Geological Survey, Coalbed Methane—An Untapped Energy Resource and an Environmental 
Concern, FS-019-97 (1997) http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs123-00/fs123-00.pdf. 
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generally lie in narrow, impermeable seams with low CBM recovery), coals in the West 
typically lie in thick and highly fractured seams that allow for excellent gas recovery. 
Shallow coal deposit may be mined conventionally for their coal, but deeper deposits 
can only be exploited for the methane they contain. Conservative estimates for total CBM 
reserves in the coterminous United States are 700 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)13 with up to 186 
Tcf technically recoverable.14 To put these figures in context, total U.S. natural gas 
consumption in 2006 was 21.78 Tcf, and is slated to hover between 23 and 24 Tcf 
annually between now and 2030.15 Figure 1 shows the location of major basins in the 
Intermountain West, as well as their projected volumes of estimate economically 













                                                 
13 Id. 
14 This number is the sum of the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2005 proved CBM reserves 
(19.9 Tcf) plus the Potential Gas Committees 2006 estimate of 166.1 Tcf that may be found and produced 
in the future. See U.S. Energy Information Administration,  Coalbed Methane Proved Reserves and 
Production, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_enr_cbm_a_EPG0_r51_Bcf_a.htm; Potential Gas Comm., 
Announcing the 2006 PGC Natural Gas Resource Estimates and Biennial Report, 
http://www.mines.edu/research/pga/. 
15 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2008 Overview at 12 available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/earlyrelease.pdf. 
16 There are various measures of CBM reserves from different groups and with different methodologies that 
vary wildly. For example, some estimate the Greater Green River basin to contain over 314 Tcf of CBM 
reserves, but of this amount only 2.7 Tcf are estimated to be economically recoverable. Cf. Scott R. Reeves; 
George J. Koperna; & Vello A. Kuuskraa, Nature and Importance of Technology Progress for 
Unconventional Gas (July 24, 2007) available at http://www.adv-
res.com/pdf/ARI%20GJ%204%20Unconventional%20Gas%20Technology%207_24_07.pdf and U.S. 




Figure 1: Estimated Economically Recoverable Coalbed Methane  Reserves in the 




In addition to having a large amount of estimated economically recoverable CBM, 
Colorado is home to the highest amount of proved18 CBM reserves in the continental 
                                                 
17Modified after Ted McCallister, Unconventional Gas: Challenges, Successes, and Future Outlook 
Unconventional Gas Production Projections in  the Annual Energy Outlook 2005: An Overview, (April 12, 
2005) (Presented at the U.S. Energy Information Administration Midterm Energy Outlook and Modeling 
Conference in Washington, DC).  
18 The U.S. Energy Information Administration defines “proved reserves” as  “the estimated quantities 
which analysis of geological and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be recoverable 
in future years from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions. Reservoirs are 
considered proved if economic producibility is supported by actual production or conclusive formation test 
(drill stem or wire line), or if economic producibility is supported by core analyses and/or electric or other 
log interpretations.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural gas Navigator: Definitions, Sources, 
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United States (6.34 Tcf), followed by New Mexico (4.89 Tcf) and Wyoming (2.45 Tcf).19 
In 2006, annual production was greatest in New Mexico (0.51 Tcf), Colorado (0.48), and 
Wyoming (0.38 Tcf).20 
 
B. Water Quality and Quantity 
 
Nearly all underground coal seams exist at a saturated condition, and the water 
quantity and quality is often related to the depth of the coal seam. Shallow, younger coals 
like those found in the Western United States are highly porous, and contain large 
amounts of relatively clean water (often associated with original deposition or subsequent 
meteoric groundwater infiltration). As coals mature and consolidate, their porosity 
decreases, and water is driven into surrounding strata. Consolidation causes net water 
movement toward the ground surface, with overlying clays and shales serving as filters, 
trapping salts from migrating upward and increasing the salinity of deeper formations.21 
The net effect of these phenomena is a general salinity gradient that increases with depth, 
and a water to coal volume ratio that decreases with depth (i.e., shallow, young coals 
contain large amounts of high quality water, and deep, older coals contain smaller 
amounts of saline water). 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Explanatory Notes, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/TblDefs/ng_enr_cbm_tbldef2.asp (emphasis 
added). 
19 See EIA supra note 7 (values are for 2006). 
20 Id.  
21 See ALL 2006 supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 10. 
10 
Water quality for CBM produced water is often given in terms of total dissolved 
solids (TDS),22 a measure of all dissolved salts or salinity. When used for irrigation or 
livestock watering, saline water can stress or kill crops and animals. Saline irrigation 
water can present an especially serious problem in arid regions, where limited leaching 
and evapoconcentration can cause salts to build up near the root zones of plants, limiting 
their ability to absorb water.  
Unlike coal seams, traditional oil and gas reserves are usually associated with marine 
depositions. As a consequence, the water associated with their production often has TDS 
measures as high as seawater (approximately 35,000 mg/L)23 or higher, due to the 
filtering effect of overlying strata. TDS levels of 350,000 to 400,000 mg/L (10 to11 times 
saltier than seawater) have been reported with extraction of traditional oil and gas 
reserves in deep formations.24  
 
Table 1: Selected Water Quality 
 
Average Depth of 
Potable Water 
Wells (ft) 




TDS (mg/L) Range 
and (Typical) 
                                                 
22 Sodium Absorption Ratio (SAR) and concentrations of other toxic components are also measures of 
CBM produced water quality. Dissolved solids in water are a combination of sodium (as found in table salt) 
and other salts. The sodium hazard of soil, or sodicity, is expressed as the sodium adsorption ratio (SAR) – 
the proportion of sodium ions  to calcium plus magnesium ions.  Sodic irrigation water may cause clay soils 
to swell and soil aggregates to disperse, clogging soil pores which results in decreased infiltration and soil 
permeability. Soil damage from sodic irrigation water is most pronounced when the salinity is low (i.e., 
water with low salinity (TDS) but a high relative concentration of sodium to other ions (SAR) will damage 
clay soils the most). 
23 The Ruckelshaus Inst. of Env. & Nat. Res. & The Univ. of Wyoming, Water Production from Coalbed 
Methane Development in Wyoming: A Summary of Quantity, Quality, and Management Options, Prepared 







N/A N/A 500 
Lake Mead26 Surface N/A 640 
San Pellegrino 
mineral water27 Surface N/A 960 
Livestock 
Watering28 N/A N/A 1,000-7,000 
Powder River  200-1,80029 270-4,00030 
Raton  400-4,00031 530-6,000
32 
(1,000)33 




Uinta37  1,000- 7,000 (4,300) 9,286-31,000 
Piceance38 200 4,000-12,000 (6,000) 15,000 
Atlantic Ocean39 N/A N/A 35,000 
Great Salt 
Lake40 N/A N/A 230,000 
Conventional 
Oil and Gas N/A Varies 5,000-410,000
41 
 
                                                 
25 40 C.F.R. § 143.3. 
26 See Wyoming Governor’s Report, supra note 23. 
27 San Pellegrino, Chemical Structure, http://www.sanpellegrino.com. 
28 R.S. Ayers & D.W. Westcot, Water Quality for Agriculture, (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, Rome, 1976). The EPA limit for livestock watering is 2,000 mg/L. See Wyoming 
Governor’s Report, supra note 23. 
29 ALL Consulting, Coalbed Methane: What is it and How do you Get it Out?, http://www.all-
llc.com/CBM/pdf/CBMIntro2004IOGCC_11-20.pdf. 
30 Jim Otton, Estimated Volume and Quality of Produced Water Associated with Projected Energy 
Resources in the Western U.S., Produced Water Workshop 26, 30, available at 
http://cwrri.colostate.edu/Produced%20Waters/Proceedings%20Final%20PDF.pdf. 
31 See ALL Consulting, supra note 29.  
32 Otton, supra note 30, at 30. 
33 U.S. Env. Protection Agency, Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources of Drinking Water by 
Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Reservoirs, EPA 816-R-04-003 (June 2004) [hereinafter EPA] 
available at www.epa.gov/safewater. 
34 Telephone Interview with Dick Wolfe, State Eng'r, State of Colo. (Dec. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Wolfe 
interview]. 




39 See Wyoming Governor’s Report, supra note 23. 
40 Id. 
41 Otton, supra note 30, at 30. 
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Water quantity is another important aspect of coalbed methane extraction. Water 
produced during oil and gas operations constitutes the industry’s most prolific product 
(98 percent of waste fluids; a total of 14 billion barrels of water were produced in 
2004).42 While these figures are impressive in themselves, when compared to 2006 
annual domestic production volumes of oil and gas (1.9 billion barrels and 23.9 trillion 
cubic feet, respectively) it is no wonder why some analysts characterize oil and gas  as a 
byproduct to the production of water.43 CBM produced water is a significant and 
increasing portion of this total – the Powder River basin alone produced over 670 million 
barrels of water in 2006 (even though less than 5% of the basin CBM reserves have been 
exploited).44 
  
C. Extraction Processes 
 
In a typical CBM well, the operator drills a hole from the surface into the coal 
seam, casing and cementing the drill hole as it progresses to protect shallower aquifers 
from becoming contaminated or leaking into the drill hole. The coal seam is then drilled 
out to open up more coal face to production. In areas where the coal is not naturally 
fractured, the seam may be cavitated45 or stimulated46 to increase coal seam permeability 
                                                 
42 See ALL 2006, supra note 8 at 2. 
43 Id. 
44 This is a compilation of data from the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, which lists 
production statistics on its  website.  http://wogcc.state.wy.us/  under “statistics.” 
45 Two means are commonly used to increase coal seam permeability: cavitation and stimulation through 
fracturing. In cavitation, air, water, gel or foam (or a combination thereof) is pumped into the well to 
increase the pressure in the reservoir, followed by a sudden release that blows out the mixture along with 
coal fragments. This “surge” in pressure enlarges and cleans the well bore by as much as 16 feet in 
diameter in the coal seam and propagates fractures that extend from the well bore. If the cavitation fractures 
connect to natural fractures in the coal, they provide channels for gas to more easily flow to the well. La 
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and gas recovery. A submersible pump is run into the well to pump the water from the 
coal seam in order to release the methane held in place by water pressure. Analogous to 
opening a soda can,47 dewatering reduces hydrostatic pressure and allows for methane 
desorption to occur. The methane flows up both the casing of the well and is sent via pipe 
to a gas-water separator at the compression station. The methane is then compressed for 
shipment to the natural gas sales pipeline.48 Unlike in traditional oil and gas extraction, 
water production in CBM wells is high at the outset and then drops off dramatically.49 
Gas production does not begin until the pressure is reduced, and typically increases over 
the life of the well before finally dropping off.  
 
Figure 2: Typical Production Curves of Water and Coalbed Methane over Time 
                                                                                                                                                 
Plata County Energy Council, Gas Facts - Production Overview, 
http://www.energycouncil.org/gasfacts/prodover.htm. 
46 In stimulation through hydraulic fracturing, fluids and sand are forced into the coal formation at very 
high pressures to hydraulically fracture the coal seams. Sand particles in the hydraulic fluid prop up the 
widened and newly created fractures in the coal allowing more methane gas to escape after much of the 
hydraulic fluid and ground water have been pumped out of the well. Hydraulic fracturing was thought to 
introduce harmful contaminants into underground aquifers. After a multiyear study, the EPA concluded that 
“the injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids into CBM wells poses little or no threat to USDWs” and that 
“Continued investigation . . . is not warranted at this time.” See EPA, supra note 33. 
47 Hal Clifford, Drilling Method Pumps up Floods of Conflict, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 3, 2002, 
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0103/p3s1-usgn.html. 
48 ALL Consulting, Handbook on Coalbed Methane Produced Water: Management and Beneficial Use 
Alternatives, (July 2003) [hereinafter ALL 2003] (prepared for the Ground Water Protection Research 
Foundation; U.S. Department of Energy; National Petroleum Technology Office; Bureau of Land 
Management ) available at http://www.all-llc.com/CBM/BU/index.htm. 
49 Traditional oil and gas wells produce primarily hydrocarbons at the outset and then increasing amounts 
of water. Oil wells approaching the end of their useful life are sometimes known as “stripper” wells, which 
commonly produce as much as 40 barrels of water for each barrel of oil. Id. at 2. 
14 
 
D. Is CBM dewatering “Beneficial Use?” 
 
Each state in the intermountain west regulates water resources through the doctrine of 
prior appropriation – judicially born in Colorado in 1882 after Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch 
Company,50 and judicially and/or statutorily recognized within 20 years of the that 
decision in all eight Rocky Mountain States.51 The prior appropriation doctrine provides 
that an intentional diversion of water with subsequent application to beneficial use52 
                                                 
50 6 Colo. 443 (1882). 
51 GEORGE VRANESH, VRANESH’S COLORADO WATER LAW: REVISED EDITION 9, (Univ. Press of Colo., 
James N. Corbridge & Teresa A. Rice, Rev. eds. 1999) (1987). 
52 “Beneficial use” is mentioned in the Constitutions of Colorado, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, and New 
Mexico. See Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6 (“The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural 
stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied.”); Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3 (making water available for 
appropriation for beneficial use); Utah Const. art. XVII, § 1 (confirming existing rights to use water for 
beneficial purposes); Wyo. Const. art. VIII, § 3 (“Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give the 
better right.”); N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 1 (“All existing rights to the use of any waters in this state for any 
useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed.”). 
15 
constitutes an appropriation.53 Water “rights” are based on the date of the appropriation, 
with the first appropriators holding senior rights to later (junior) appropriators. In 1983, 
the Ninth Circuit proclaimed that there were “differences in water law among the various 
western states” but that “on the point of what is beneficial use the law is general and 
without significant dissent.”54 Until the commercial exploitation of coalbed methane, this 
statement was generally true. Today, however, the concept of beneficial use for CBM 
dewatering varies between the states, with Wyoming recognizing CBM dewatering as 
beneficial use, and Montana, New Mexico, and Utah finding that beneficial use is only 
subsequent to diversion. Prior to July 2007, Colorado did not recognize CBM dewatering 
as a beneficial use.  
In November 2005, two ranchers in the San Juan Basin of southwest Colorado filed a 
declaratory relief action seeking a determination that tributary ground water diverted in 
the process of extracting CBM was an “appropriation” requiring CBM producers to 
comply with state water laws.55 Central to the court’s inquiry was whether CBM 
dewatering constituted an (1) intentional (2) diversion of the waters of the state with 
subsequent (4) application to (5) a beneficial use (6) without waste.56  
Whether CBM extraction constituted a diversion of the waters of the state was not in 
serious contention. Removing groundwater by pumping constitutes a “diversion” under a 
relatively clear statutory definition.57 In Colorado, “waters of the state” means “all 
surface and underground water in or tributary to all natural streams within the state of 
                                                 
53 See VRANESH, supra note 51, at 32. 
54 United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 1 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS 19.2 (R. Clark ed., 1967). 
55 Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Vance v. Simpson, No. 2005CW063 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 7, July 2, 2007). 
56 See VRANESH, supra note 51, at 32. 
57 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(7) (2007). 
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Colorado” outside designated groundwater basins.58 Appropriations also require intent. 
Although the CBM producers sought methane, not water, the court found that their 
actions demonstrated intent to divert the water.59  
The primary issue in Vance was whether dewatering coal seams to release gas was 
“beneficial use” of the produced water without which there could be no appropriation. In 
Colorado, beneficial use is statutorily defined in the Water Right Determination and 
Administration Act of 1969 as “the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and 
appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose 
for which the appropriation is lawfully made . . . .60  
Before this codification, beneficial use was historically defined by Colorado 
courts on a case-by-case basis. The generality of the statutory definition (both explicitly 
and due to the fact that “waste” is not defined anywhere in the Act)61 implies that there 
may be no difference in interpretation of beneficial use under the statute or under the 
common law.62 In examining beneficial use cases, courts have recognized three main 
goals of the beneficial use concept: (1) avoiding speculation and monopoly of water 
resources (only actual, bona-fide uses would trigger an appropriation); (2) maximizing 
                                                 
58 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(13) (2007). Designated groundwater basins are geographically defined 
non-tributary aquifers primarily on the plains portion of Colorado and are subject to the jurisdiction of 
Colorado Groundwater Commission. See generally Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-90-103 to 108 (2007). 
59 In Three Bells Ranch Associations v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Association, owners of gravel pits 
were required by the State to reclaim land after mining operations concluded. The reclamation plan 
included the creation of recreation and fishing ponds (a beneficial use) fed by tributary groundwater. The 
gravel pit operators argued that because their intent was not to appropriate water, but to mine gravel, no 
appropriation had occurred. The court disagreed, finding that “intent” was evidenced by digging the gravel 
pits and reclaiming the land, regardless of the fact that the pit operators were forced to do so by the Mined 
Lands Reclamation Act. 758 P.2d 164, 70-73 (Colo. 1988) (“persons intend the reasonable, natural, and 
probable consequences of their actions”). 
60 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(4) (2007). 
61 The Colorado Groundwater Management Act does define “waste” as “causing, suffering, or permitting 
any well to discharge water unnecessarily above or below the surface of the ground.” C.R.S. 37-90-103(20) 
(2007). Because dewatering is “necessary” to extract methane, this definition is presumably not applicable 
as long as methane extraction is underway.  
62 See VRANESH, supra note 51, at 44. 
17 
water use (wasteful practices would not constitute beneficial use); and (3) providing 
flexibility to the water user (a loosely defined concept could change over time as new 
uses for water are established).63 In keeping with the flexibility of the concept, Colorado 
courts have recognized uses unknown when the state constitution was written as 
beneficial, including power generation64 and aquaculture.65 Other jurisdictions have 
attempted to maximize water use by excluding certain wasteful uses from the beneficial 
category that could be accomplished without using water (such as drowning gophers,66 
softening a field for plowing,67 flushing debris during the irrigation season,68 and using 
the water to deposit gravel for mining69). A case in Colorado found that pumping 
groundwater simply to test a well pump was not beneficial use.70 Although this seems to 
fall into the wasteful category (the tester could have used other means to test the pump) 
the court’s reasoning was centered on speculative nature of the purported beneficial use.71   
British Petroleum America (the operator of most CBM wells in the San Juan 
Basin) and the Colorado State Engineer both filed briefs in Vance. They argued that 
beneficial use required an “application” of the water to some purpose to constitute 
beneficial use, and although dewatering was necessary for CBM extraction, the water was 
not “used to force or draw natural gas from the target formation . . . [nor] used to process 
                                                 
63 Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western 
Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998). 
64 City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1939). 
65 Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co. v. Ft. Collins Milling & Elevator Co., 152 P. 1160 (Colo. 1915). 
66 Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935). 
67 Hennings v. Water Resources Dep't, 622 P.2d 333 (Or. 1981). 
68 In re Water Rights of Deschutes River & Tributaries, 286 P. 563 (Or. 1930). The court did allowed the 
use during winter as long as it did not interfere with storage requirements for irrigation. Id. at 578. 
69 Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967). 
70 Danielson v. Milne, 765 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1988). 
71 Id. 
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or transport the produced gas . . . .”72 Simply stated, the water wasn’t doing anything – it 
was just something that was in the way, and if it magically disappeared, all the better. 
The court disagreed, finding that because the dewatering was essential to the process, 
there was an application of the water.73  
 The strongest argument put forth by BP and the SEO was Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-
90-137(7), which states that for some types of mine dewatering, “[n]o well permit shall 
be required unless the . . . ground water being removed will be beneficially used” which 
implies that dewatering, in itself, is not a beneficial use. The court seemingly painted 
itself in a corner – it had already used that exact subsection to show that the legislature 
had intended permit exceptions to apply only in certain instances. Interestingly, the 
argument was not addressed by the court. Perhaps the court felt that permitting 
exceptions were within the competency of the legislature, so deference to their intent was 
appropriate in those cases, but beneficial use, though codified, was a common law 
concept best interpreted by the courts, and that reliance on a somewhat vague expression 
of legislative intent was inappropriate.  
The ranchers contended that the water was “used” to allow gas extraction and 
then “used up” by reinjection into deep saline aquifers.74 Because the water was used 
(defined by the plaintiffs as “removed from the [groundwater] system and made 
physically unavailable to senior vested water rights”) there were only two options: either 
the water was “beneficially used” or the water was “wasted.”75 Under either scenario, the 
                                                 
72 Brief for Defendant-Intervenor (BP America) at 10, Vance v. Simpson, No. 2005CW063 (Colo. Dist. Ct., 
Water Div. 7, July 2, 2007). 
73 The court seemed to struggle with this concept, citing the dictionary definition of “application” without 
further elaboration. Vance v. Simpson, No. 2005CW063 at 16 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 7, July 2, 2007). 
74 Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Vance v. Simpson, No. 2005CW063 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 7, July 2, 2007). 
75 Id. at 4. 
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State Engineer’s Office (SEO) had a non-discretionary duty to regulate the diversion.76 
The relevant statute states that 
Each division engineer shall order the total or partial discontinuance of 
any diversion in his division to the extent that the water being diverted is 
not necessary for application to a beneficial use; and he shall also order 
the total or partial discontinuance of any diversion in his division to the 
extent that the water being diverted is required by persons entitled to use 
water under water rights having senior priorities, but no such 
discontinuance shall be ordered unless the diversion is causing or will 
cause material injury to such water rights having senior priorities.77  
 
 BP argued that classifying any movement of water as either beneficial use or waste 
would, in some cases, forbid dewatering construction sites, allowing trees to grow on a 
riverbank, or plowing snow.78 Simply stated, there are some water displacements outside 
the purview of the SEO that were neither beneficial use nor waste.79 While this is certainly 
true, it may be more due to SEO custom rather than statutory reasoning; each of the 
instances cited except for the natural tree growth would qualify as a diversion and 
potentially implicate the waste statute. In any case, because the court found CBM 
dewatering to be a beneficial use there was no need to rule on the issue of waste. 
 As later noted in this paper, viewing CBM dewatering as an appropriation rather 
than a byproduct waste is both legally and economically significant, involving major shifts 
in costs and regulatory structure.  
 
E. Produced Water Disposal and Use 
 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-502(2)(a) (2007) (emphasis added). 
78 Brief for Defendant-Intervenor (BP America) at 22-23, Vance v. Simpson, No. 2005CW063 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct., Water Div. 7, July 2, 2007). 
79 Id. 
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After water is brought to the surface, CBM extractors either discharge the water 
on the surface or inject it deep underground, depending on basin geology, demand for 
water, and water quality. Approximately 60% of all oil and gas industry produced water 
is managed via deep injection disposal wells.80 
CBM produced water is also disposed of on the surface. Typical disposal 
methods include placement in lined pits (to allow for evaporation) unlined pits (to 
allow the water to seep into shallow aquifers), dust suppression, air spraying 
(which allows for evaporation), or traditional beneficial uses such as irrigation, 
stock watering, wildlife habitat enhancement, and even use as municipal drinking 
water, In some basins, landowners have come to depend on the produced water 
for farming and ranching.81  
Opportunity for beneficial use varies across basins and depends on the 
quality of the produced water, the demand for water (which may be related to the 
aridity of the basin); and the type of use and cost of treatment, transportation, and 
permitting. Table 2 outlines the potential beneficial uses for CBM water in 
Colorado’s San Juan Basin. Produced water in the basin varies from 410 to 
170,000 mg/L TDS, with a small quantity of high quality water near the Fruitland 
outcrop and much lower values throughout the basin. The basin is arid (average 
annual precipitation is between 12 and 28 inches)82 but there are a number of 
rivers that meet much of the demand for the few, mostly rural consumers. As the 
table shows, opportunity for beneficial use is low in most parts of the basin. 
                                                 
80 Id. at 27 
81 Id. at 5 
82 See S.S. Papadopulos & Colo. Geological Survey, Coalbed Methane Stream Depletion Assessment Study 
– Northern San Juan Basin, Colorado (Feb. 2006), available at 
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/pdf/CMSDA_Study.pdf. 
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Consequently, nearly 99% of produced water in the San Juan Basin is injected 
into deep formations.83 Where demand and water quality are higher, as in the 
Raton basin of Colorado, opportunities for beneficial use increase (in the Raton 
Basin 70% of water is discharged to the surface and some of this water is used 
beneficially).84 In areas such as the Powder River Basin where water quality is 
high but demand is low, 99.9% of the produced water is discharged on the 
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86 Modified from Papadopulos, supra note 82 at  Table 7.1. 
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Fire protection and 






stream flow Est. <600 mg/L
87 Only adjacent to outcrop 
Local use or 
Conveyance 
Low, not an issue in 
the basin 
Augmentation 
Based on use 
and point of 
discharge 
Unknown, 
depends on use 










Est. <600 mg/L88 Only adjacent to outcrop 
Local use or 
Conveyance Very low 
 
In Gillette, Wyoming, high quality CBM water is reinjected into depleted sandy 
aquifers that serve the city as a source of drinking water.89 The city’s well field, located 
in a sandy formation at approximately 1,500 feet, had been locally depleted, so the city 
coordinated with a CBM operator to install aquifer recharge wells sufficient to manage 
all of the produced water from a small CBM producing project.90 Some of the injection 
wells averaged over one million barrels per year for over three years. The city is currently 
studying direct use of these waters by mixing water pumped during coalbed methane gas 
production with regular drinking water to stretch the city’s supply in the face of a 
projected water shortage.91 CBM operators note that they would be willing to help the 
                                                 
87 5 Code. Colo. Regs. § 1002-34 gives the classifications and numeric standards for the San Juan and 
Dolores river basins, but does not include a specific TDS limit. The TDS limit above was calculated from 
BLM TDS numbers for local streams, and assuming that CBM water should not degrade stream quality. 
See Papadopulos, supra note 82. 
88 Id. 
89 ALL Consulting, Feasibility Study of Expanded Coalbed Natural Gas Produced Water Management 
Alternatives in the Wyoming Portion of the Powder River Basin: Phase One, (Jan. 2006) at 11 (Prepared for 




91 Associated Press, Gillette Studies CBM Water Use, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 2007, available at 
http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2007/11/08/news/wyoming/32-gillette.txt. 
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city out provided the cost of treatment and transportation would not exceed the current 
injection disposal costs.92  
 Disposal options may be placed into two categories based on their effects on 
future water resource availability, and potential for long term harm to the environment. 
The most “sustainable” practices include:  
1. Reinjection into aquifers depleted or otherwise affected by CBM 
production; 
2. Injection or percolation into depleted aquifers with water treatment as 
required, protecting and/or enhancing water quality; 
3. Crop, livestock, municipal or industrial use with water treatment and other 
mitigations as required, insuring against negative impacts; 
4. Surface discharges with water treatment as required, resulting in improved 
stream flows with adequate mitigations against negative impacts.93 
The least sustainable practices are: 
1. Evaporation of water resulting in loss of resource; 
2. Injection or percolation into aquifers where water quality is deteriorated 
and negative hydrological impacts occur; 
3. Land application that creates negative impacts on soils and water quality; 
4. Direct discharges that degrade water quality and negatively impacts 
aquatic life, downstream users or result in loss of resource.94 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 James R. Kuipers, Coalbed Methane-Produced Water: Management Options for Sustainable 
Development, (Aug. 19, 2004) (Presented at the CBNG Research, Monitoring, and Applications 
Conference) available at http://www.cbmclearinghouse.info/research.html. 
94 Id. 
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Deep injection may be “sustainable” or not depending on the quality of the 
produced water, the quality of the receiving formation, and the region’s water needs. The 
government of British Columbia states that deep injection is the best management 
practice available in North America,95 but placing high quality CBM water into deep, 
highly saline aquifers precludes later extraction without extensive treatment, and can 
hardly be viewed as a “best management practice” in the arid west.96 Conversely, 
injecting low quality brine into a low quality receiving aquifer and thus avoiding surface 
or shallow aquifer contamination would be a “sustainable” means of disposal.  
 
 
II. CURRENT REGULATION OF PRODUCED WATER 
 
A. Agencies and Courts 
Colorado’s approach to water and oil and gas regulation is typical of Western States, 
and is overseen by three agencies. The State Engineer’s Office (SEO) was tasked with 
overseeing the distribution of the waters of the state,97 including ground water well 
permitting outside designated groundwater basins.98 Unlike most western states, 
Colorado also has a water court system that works in conjunction with the SEO. The 
seven district water courts are responsible for adjudicating water rights, setting priority 
                                                 
95 The B.C. government does not allow any surface discharge of CBM produced water. See British 
Columbia Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, The BC Energy Plan: A Vision for Clean 
energy Leadership, (Feb. 27, 2007) available at 
http://www.energyplan.gov.bc.ca/PDF/BC_Energy_Plan.pdf. 
96 In this case, deep injection would resemble evaporation in that the water would be lost to both current 
and future users. 
97 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-80-102(h) (2007). 
98 This  would be regulated by the Colorado Groundwater Commission. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(1) 
(2007). 
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dates, and approving plans for augmentation. The Colorado Water Quality Control 
Division has authority for discharges of pollutants into the waters of the state (including 
CBM produced water). The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) 
was tasked by the legislature to broadly regulate the oil and gas industry, including all 
exploration and production waste from oil and gas operations.99 Exploration and 
production waste includes produced water.100 The Colorado Supreme Court has 
interpreted the statute creating the Commission as “an effort to clarify that the only state 
administrative body with regulatory authority over oil and gas activities is the Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission.”101 
 
B. Colorado Oil and Gas Regulation 
 
The typical permitting process for CBM operators in Colorado can be a relatively 
streamlined process, depending on the source and disposal method of the produced water. 
An applicant first contacts the COGCC for a permit to drill. After the well is constructed, 
an additional well permit is obtained from the COGCC. Once the well is constructed, 
COGCC rule 907 governs the disposal of produced water, allowing eight methods of 
disposal, including: 
1. Injection into a Class II well (permitted by the COGCC); 
                                                 
99 Colorado defines “oil and gas operations” broadly as “exploration for oil and gas, . . . the siting, drilling, 
deepening, recompletion, reworking, or abandonment of an oil and gas well, underground injection well, or 
gas storage well; production operations related to any such well . . . ; the generation, transportation, storage, 
treatment, or disposal of exploration and production wastes; and any construction, site preparation, or 
reclamation activities associated with such operations. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-103 (6.5) (2007).  The 
COGCC has extensive power to regulate oil and gas operations. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-106(2)(a) & (9) & 
(17)(e) (2007). 
100 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-103 (6.5) (2007). 
101 Board of County Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1057 (Colo. 1992) (interpreting 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-105(1)). 
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2. Discharging into state waters, in accordance with the Water Quality Control Act 
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder (permitted by the 
CWQCD); 
3. Beneficial use in accordance with applicable state statutes and regulations 
governing the use and administration of water (requires a well permit from the 
SEO, may require Water Court adjudication, as well as a CWQCD permit); 
4. May be used to provide an alternate domestic water supply to surface owners 
within the oil or gas field (permitted by the CWQCD).102 
 
Option 1 subjects operators to regulation from a single agency and is currently the 
most common disposal method in Colorado. Most surface discharges require an 
additional permit from the CWQCD. Traditional beneficial uses are allowed through 3 
and 4, although neither section provides much incentive for this type of use.103  
All underground injection is overseen by the EPA pursuant to the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, which includes five classifications of wells (three of which are applicable to 
                                                 
102Other methods include evaporation/percolation in a properly permitted lined or unlined pit; disposal at 
permitted commercial facilities (permitted by the COGCC); disposal by road spreading on lease roads 
outside sensitive areas for produced waters with less than 5,000 mg/l TDS when authorized by the surface 
owner (subject to regulation by the COGCC); and reinjection into producing zones for enhanced recovery, 
drilling, and other uses in a manner consistent with existing water rights and in consideration of water 
quality standards and classifications established by the WQCC for waters of the state; Colo. Oil & Gas 
Conservation Comm'n, Rules and Regulations 907 (2007), http://www.oil-gas.state.co.us. 
103 The shortcomings of 3 are discussed below. 4 also provides little incentive for operators to offer water 
for domestic use. The rules deem such use “shall be to the benefit of the surface owner within the oil and 
gas field and may not be sold for profit or traded . . .” providing little incentive for operators to go through 
the CWQCD permitting process, other than to gain the good graces of locals. The rule is, however, 
carefully crafted to avoid regulation by the SEO. First, because the use is for the benefit of the surface 
owner, any beneficial use is not attributable to the operator but rather to the local surface user. Because the 
water is still waste from the operator’s perspective, COGCC jurisdiction is retained. If the beneficial use 
was that of the operator, then the state engineer’s office would acquire jurisdiction. Second, the rule denies 
any implication of material injury to surface holder’s rights, stating that “[p]rovision of produced water for 
domestic use . . . shall not constitute an admission by the operator that the well is dewatering or impacting 
any existing water well.” 
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CBM produced water).104 Class I wells are used to inject industrial waste, class II wells 
are used for produced water and other fluids associated with oil and gas operations, and 
class V wells are used for shallow injection of non-hazardous fluids into or above 
aquifers.105  Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico have primacy over each type of well,106 
while Colorado and Montana only regulate Class II wells107 and leave other categories to 
the EPA.108   
Class I wells have the strictest requirements: the waste must be injected below any 
underground source of drinking water (USDW)109 with sufficient confinement layers 
above the injection zone that “no reasonable possibility of contamination” exists.110 
Although there are currently no Class I wells in the Intermountain West, treatment of 
produced water would result in a relatively small amounts of concentrated waste. As a 
byproduct of industrial activity (rather than oil and gas activities) disposal by injection 
could only occur in a class I well.111  
Class II injection wells are regulated by the states, and are the primary means of 
disposal for oil and gas activities. As an example, Colorado allows Class II injections into 
                                                 
104 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. 
105 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Classes of Wells, http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/wells.html. 
106 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency , UIC Program Primacy, 
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/primacy.html. 
107 Montana has expressed interest in regulating Class V wells but no application has yet been submitted. 
Mont. Dep’t of Nat. Res. Conservation, Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation, 
http://bogc.dnrc.state.mt.us/BoardSummaries.asp 
108 See EPA, supra note 106. 
109 Underground Source of Drinking Water (USDW) means an aquifer or its portion: 
(a)   (1) Which supplies any public water system; or 
        (2) Which contains sufficient quantity of ground water to supply a public water system; and  
                      (i) Currently supplies drinking water for human consumption; or 
                      (ii) Contains fewer than 10,000 mg/l total dissolved solids; and 
(b) Which is not an exempted aquifer. 40 Code Fed. Reg. § 144.3. 
110 See EPA, supra note 33. 
111 See ALL 2003, supra  note 48. 
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any formation that is not a USDW,112 unless the aquifer is exempted.113  The majority of 
class II injection wells serve the dual purposes of disposal and recovery of additional 
minerals (enhanced oil recovery; or pressure maintenance through water flooding to 
recover additional natural gas in conventional reserves).114  
 
C. Colorado Groundwater Regulation 
 
In Colorado, the Colorado Ground Water Commission has primary authority over the 
administration of “designated” ground water.115 However, most of the state’s 
groundwater lies outside designated basins and is administered by the State Engineer’s 
Office (SEO), including “tributary” groundwater (hydrologically connected to a natural 
stream system either by surface or underground flows) and “nontributary” ground water; 
defined as “ground water . . .  the withdrawal of which will not, within one hundred 
years, deplete the flow of a natural stream . . . at an annual rate greater than one-tenth of 
                                                 
112 40 CFR § 144.3. 
113 A water-bearing formation may be exempted if: 
 (1) It does not currently serve as a source of drinking water; and either subparagraph (2) or 
(3) below apply: 
(2) It cannot now and will not in the future serve as a source of drinking water because: 
A. It is . . . or can be demonstrated . . .  to contain minerals or hydrocarbons that … are 
expected to be commercially producible; or 
B. It is situated at a depth or location which makes recovery of water for drinking water 
purposes economically or technologically impractical; or 
C. It is so contaminated that it would be economically or technologically impractical to 
render the water fit for human consumption; 
(3) The total dissolved solids content of the ground water is more than three thousand 
(3,000) and less than ten thousand (10,000) milligrams per liter and it is not reasonably 
expected to supply a public water system. 
Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, Rules and Regulations 325 (2007), http://www.oil-gas.state.co.us. 
114 See ALL 2006, supra note 8 at 4. 
115 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-107 – 109 (2007) Because these types of water lie in defined basins with little 
overlap with CBM reserves, they are outside the scope of this paper.. 
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one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal.”116 Both types are administered using a 
permit system. 
Tributary ground water is integrated with surface waters and managed through the 
doctrine of prior appropriation as outlined in the Colorado Constitution.117 All 
groundwater is presumed to be tributary to a stream unless proven otherwise.118 New 
water wells require a permit from the SEO,119 who must determine that there is 
unappropriated water available for withdrawal and that the vested water rights of others 
will not be materially injured by the proposed well.120 Both must be substantiated by 
hydrological and geological facts.121 Tributary well permits are more difficult to obtain 
than surface diversions; if a surface body is fully appropriated at any time during the year 
the tributary ground water is “fully appropriated” and any withdrawal causes material 
injury to senior appropriators by definition.122 After a permit is granted, a diverter may 
then petition the water court for a priority date and a water right in the tributary 
groundwater. Permits may be issued in fully appropriated basins pursuant to an 
augmentation plan.123 These plans are approved by a water court, and detail how, when, 
and where an appropriator will increase the water in a stream system to prevent injury to 
senior appropriators. Although not always required, most augmentation plans detail how 
                                                 
116 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-103(10.5) (2007). 
117 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-101 –  602 (2007); Colo. Const. Art. XVI, §6. 
118 See Platte Valley Irrigation Co. v. Buckers Irrigation, Milling, & Improvement Co., 53 P. 334 (Colo. 
1898). 
119 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(1) (2007). 
120 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(2)(b)(I) (2007). 
121 Id. 
122 See Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1973). 
123 A plan for augmentation is “a detailed program . . . to increase the supply of water available for 
beneficial use . . . by development of new or alternate means or points of diversion, by pooling water 
resources, by water exchange projects, by providing substitute supplies of water, by the development of 
new sources, or by any other appropriate means.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-103(9) (2007). 
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“new” water will be added to the stream system, including transfer of other senior rights 
or the use of non-tributary groundwater to augment the surface stream.124 
Nontributary groundwater is not part of the “waters of the state” and the Colorado 
legislature has plenary power over its administration and distribution.125 The legislature 
has authorized “mining” of the resource – well permits are required from the SEO, but 
the rate of withdrawal is based on overlying land ownership and an aquifer life of 100 
years, not the rate of aquifer recharge.126 Although the SEO must determine that pumping 
will not cause material injury to other vested nontributary appropriators, “the reduction of 
either hydrostatic pressure or water level in the aquifer” is not deemed material injury.127  
Prior to the Vance ruling, CBM and oil and gas producers sidestepped most water 
well permitting requirements. “Wells” subject to permitting are “structure[s] or device[s] 
used for the purpose or with the effect of obtaining ground water for beneficial use . . . 
.”128  Because production of water during oil and gas operations was not assumed to be a 
beneficial use, there was no requirement for a permit. If the producers subsequently 
applied the produced water to beneficial use, the general rules applied for tributary 
groundwater, but nontributary groundwater followed Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(7), 
which states that  
 
In the case of dewatering of geologic formations by removing nontributary 
ground water to facilitate or permit mining of minerals: 
(a) No well permit shall be required unless the nontributary ground water 
being removed will be beneficially used; and 
(b) In the issuance of any well permit pursuant to this subsection (7), . . . 
in considering whether the permit shall issue, the requirement that the state 
                                                 
124 See Hall v. Kuiper, 550 P.2d at 303. 
125 See Kuiper v. Lundvall, 575 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1978). 
126 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(4) (2007). 
127 Id. 
128 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-103(21)(a) (2007). 
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engineer find that there is unappropriated water available for withdrawal . 
. . shall not apply. The state engineer shall allow the rate of withdrawal 
stated by the applicant to be necessary to dewater the mine; except that, if 
the state engineer finds that the proposed dewatering will cause material 
injury to the vested water rights of others, the applicant may propose, and 
the permit shall contain, terms and conditions which will prevent such 
injury. The reduction of hydrostatic pressure level or water level alone 
does not constitute material injury. 
 
Simply stated, a producer could obtain a well permit to use nontributary water from 
CBM operations, even in an over-appropriated basin, without a plan for augmentation, 
and may remove any amount of water necessary to dewater the mine. 
 
 
D. Agency Overlap Problems 
 
The Vance case outlined earlier highlights conflicts between COGCC and SEO 
jurisdiction. In Vance, the ranchers contended that the Water Right Determination and 
Administration Act of 1969 and the Colorado Ground Water Management Act required 
the State Engineer to regulate CBM water diversions, including issuing water well 
permits for CBM wells and requiring augmentation plans when tributary ground water 
was diverted in over-appropriated groundwater basins. 
The case centered on who was in responsible charge of the water pumped from coal 
seams during CBM extraction. Did the legislature vest sole authority in the COGCC to 
regulate produced water as a waste generated in gas operations, or was the removal of 
water an appropriation of the tributary waters of the state that required oversight by the 
State Engineer?  
32 
The water court began by examining the statutory authority of the COGCC and the 
SEO, finding that COGCC had exclusive authority over oil and gas conservation and 
operations, including the disposal of exploration and production waste such as produced 
water.129 The agency did not, however, have the authority to regulate the diversion of 
water except pursuant to COGCC Rule 209 (“Protection of Coal Seams and Water-
bearing Formations”) which provides that “[i]n the conduct of oil and gas operations each 
owner shall exercise due care in the protection of coal seams and water-bearing 
formations as required by the applicable statutes of the State of Colorado.”130 The court 
reasoned that the “applicable statutes of the State of Colorado” included the Water Right 
Determination and Administration Act of 1969 and the Colorado Ground Water 
Management Act, which state that the SEO has a broad, non-discretionary duty to 
“administer, distribute, and regulate the waters of the state in accordance with the 
constitution of the state of Colorado” and that “no other official, board, commission, 
department, or agency . . . has jurisdiction and authority with respect to said 
administration, distribution, and regulation.131 Those acts also vested the SEO with the 
duty to issue permits for water wells constructed outside designated groundwater 
basins,132 and the court found that CBM wells fell within the definition of “water 
well.”133 Although the “purpose” of the wells was to produce gas, the “effect” was water 
production for beneficial use.134 The court noted that because the legislature had provided 
permit exceptions in the case of mine dewatering of non-tributary ground water (“[n]o 
                                                 
129 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-105 (2007). 
130 Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, Rules and Regulations 209 (2007), http://www.oil-
gas.state.co.us. 
131 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-501(1) (2007). 
132 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(1) (2007). 
133 “Water well” is defined as any structure “used for the purpose or with the effect of obtaining ground 
water for beneficial use from an aquifer.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-103(21)(a) (2007). 
134 Id. 
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well permit shall be required unless the nontributary ground water being removed will be 
beneficially used”) the doctrine of expresio unius est exclusio alterius dictated that for 
tributary groundwater, a permit was required.135 Finally, the court dismissed the SEO’s 
agency deference argument because the SEO’s position was not a permissible 
construction of the statute.136  
Lingering doubt exists as to how far the Vance decision extends. Certainly, where CBM 
extractors are dewatering a tributary coal seam, water well permits must now be obtained 
from the State Engineer, and existing wells will likely require permitting as well.137 In fully 
appropriated basins, no permit will be issued by the SEO without a plan for 
augmentation.138 The real question, however, is how far the concept of “beneficial use” 
defined by the case extends. If dewatering to permit CBM extraction is a beneficial use, 
then presumably the permitting requirement of C.R.S. 37-90-137(7)(a) would be invoked 
(“[n]o well permit shall be required unless the nontributary ground water being removed 
will be beneficially used”) requiring even non-tributary CBM wells to be permitted. 
Taken further, if any mine dewatering is beneficial use, then even traditional oil and gas 
wells (almost exclusively located in non-tributary aquifers) may require water well 
permits.  
The costs of these outcomes could be significant. While a water well permit is only 
$100,139  no permit may be issued in a fully appropriated tributary basin without first 
                                                 
135 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(7)(a) (2007); Vance v. Simpson, No. 2005CW063 at 18 (Colo. Dist. Ct., 
Water Div. 7, July 2, 2007). 
136 Vance v. Simpson, No. 2005CW063 at 18 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 7, July 2, 2007). 
 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
137 Permitting existing wells would likely be accomplished in stages and over a series of years. Email from 
Sarah Klahn, attorney for plaintiffs in Vance v. Simpson to author  (Nov. 26, 2007 11:13:00 EST) (on file 
with author). 
138 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(2) (2007). 
139 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(2) (2007) 
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obtaining a water right and filing a plan for augmentation with a Colorado Water Court 
(an additional $467 fee).140 This process generally requires a water attorney and a water 
resources engineer.141 Applications are public, and anyone may file statements in 
opposition.142 In opposed cases, the Water Referee will often conduct an informal 
hearing, and will approve, deny, or modify the permit, and may also refer the matter to 
the Water Court Judge.143 Any person may protest a referee’s ruling, in which case the 
case would be referred to a de novo review by the Water Court Judge.144  In water court 
proceedings, the applicant carries the burden of showing absence of injury to senior water 
rights holders.145 As a matter of practice, the Water Court will allow other parties to 
intervene.146 Water court rulings are subject to appeal in the Colorado Supreme Court.147 
The entire process takes from four months to two years, depending on the complexity of 
the case and the level of opposition.148  
In addition to fees and attorney and engineering costs, an augmentation plan generally 
requires the purchase of replacement water. Although initially the plan could include use 
of the CBM produced water during the years the well is active, any augmentation plan 
would likely require the CBM producer to purchase water to cover post pumping 
depletions as well.149 BP America claims total costs of the decision could top $100,000 
                                                 
140 Colorado Division of Water Resources, Guide to Colorado Well Permits, Water Rights, and Water 
Administration, (Mar. 2006 & Rev. July 2007) available at 
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/wellpermitguide.pdf. 
141 Id. 
142 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-302(1)(b) (2007). 
143 See VRANESH, supra note 88, at 148. 
144 See VRANESH, supra note 88, at 149. 
145 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-304(3) (2007). 
146 See VRANESH, supra note 88, at 150. 
147 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-102(1)(d) (2007). 
148 Colorado Division of Water Resources, supra note 140 at 16. 
149 See Wolfe interview, supra note 34. 
35 
per well150 while the Plaintiff’s attorney has argued that “[p]aying $200 for a well permit 
or the expense associated with an augmentation plan is hardly catastrophic for this 
industry . . . they’re going to continue to get gas out of the ground. They're just going to 
do it in a way now that protects landowners.”151 Increased permitting requirements also 
raise serious doubts about the ability of the State Engineer to process all the 
applications.152 Currently, the SEO plans to wait until Vance is decided before 
approaching the legislature for more funding to meet an increased workload.153 
 
i. COGCC and Other State Agencies 
 
Agency conflict can also arise when oil and gas producers attempt to put 
produced water to traditional beneficial use. In Colorado, the statutory mechanisms 
outlined above seem simple. Most produced water (especially from deep conventional oil 
and gas extraction) would fall into the “nontributary” category and the lenient 
nontributary mine dewatering permit requirements would apply. This statute seems to 
encourage traditional beneficial use of produced water, but has so far rarely been utilized. 
A few CBM producers in the Raton basin have applied for permits to restore aspen 
groves and other vegetation destroyed in the 2002 wildfires and for water storage for fire 
suppression, but each permit has been returned: current SEO modeling shows the entire 
Raton basin CBM field as tributary, so unless the producers can demonstrate through 
                                                 
150 Kim McGuire, Battle Looms Over Water Quality, DEN. POST, Aug. 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_6616176. 
151 Kim McGuire, Farmers Win Water Ruling on Methane Gas, DEN. POST, July 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_6285559. 
152 Mark Jaffe, Water Ruling May Burden Regulators, Official Says, DEN. POST, Aug. 16, 2007, available 
at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_6633328?source=rssdp. 
153 See Wolfe interview, supra note 34. 
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hydrologic modeling that this water is non-tributary, augmentation plans would be 
required.154 Conventional gas producers have shown interest in using produced waters 
from the Republican River basin, as well as near Wellington, Colorado, but no permits 
have yet been issued to either CBM or conventional gas producers under the non-
tributary permit statute.155 
 To date in Colorado, the only well permit obtained through the non-tributary 
dewatering statute was for the Wellington oil field, who sought to treat water produced in 
oil extraction to sell to residential developers. The Wellington oil field is located north of 
Fort Collins near the Wyoming border. As a typical “stripper” well operation, it produces 
more water than oil: of the approximately 3,000 barrels of production per day, only 50 
barrels are oil.156 The field’s owner was spending over $1 per barrel to inject the saline 
byproduct water into a Class II well when a local developer approached him with a plan 
to treat and sell the water.157 The plan seemed simple: rather than inject the water 5,000 
feet underground into the same formations he was retrieving oil from, treat it and use it 
beneficially.158 The economics of the operation seemed promising. On the oil side, 
treatment would produce more oil from the water that was currently injected 
underground. Nineteen of the 35 wells on the site that were currently dedicated to water 
reinjection could be used for oil extraction, and the costs of reinjection pumping would 
be avoided.159 On the water side, a treatment plant could be constructed for 1.4 million 
                                                 
154 See Wolfe interview, supra note 34. 
155 Id. 
156 See Cherry Sokoloski, Oil, Water Mix Well in Wellington, NORTH FORTY NEWS, March, 2006, available 
at http://www.northfortynews.com/Archive/A200603oilWaterMix.htm. 
157 Kim McGuire, Unchartered Waters for Wellington: No Precedent for Rights to Abundant Coal-Bed 
Runoff, DEN. POST, Aug. 13, 2006, available at http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_6608638. 
158 See Sokoloski, supra note 156. 
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dollars,160 and could be operated for approximately $350 per acre/ft, putting the total cost 
of capacity at $2,000 to $4,000 per acre/ft.161 Water rights in the expanding Eastern Slope 
of Colorado run anywhere from $20,000 to $35,000 per acre/ft.162 The water would 
eventually end up as drinking water for the town of Wellington, increasing their drinking 
water supplies by 300 percent, and increased royalties on oil extraction would help fund 
local government. Economically, the project seemed feasible, but the oil field operator 
and the developer had no idea how complex (and expensive) permitting this type of 
operation would be. 
 Although the water involved was non-tributary traditional oil and gas byproduct 
water, the permitting process invokes many of the same statutes at issue in the Vance 
case. COGCC rule 907 states that “[t]o encourage and promote waste minimization” 
produced water “may be put to beneficial use in accordance with applicable state statutes 
and regulations governing the use and administration of water.”163 In this case, the 
“applicable state statute” is Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(7), outlined above. In issuing 
this permit, the State Engineer only had to determine that (1) the water was non-tributary 
and (2) the withdrawal would not cause material injury to the vested water rights of 
others.164 The Wellington operators would be entitled to a yearly withdrawal of “the 
amount necessary to dewater the mine” regardless of their land ownership, the 
appropriated water available, and the aquifer volume.165 However, because the permit 
                                                 
160 See id. 
161 Email from Dr. David R. Stewart, President and CEO of Stewart Environmental Consultants, Inc. to 
author (Dec. 18, 2007 17:13:00 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Stewart email]. Dr. Stewart designed 
the treatment facility for the Wellington oilfield project and was instrumental in all stages of the process. 
162 Id. 
163 Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, Rules and Regulations 907(a)(3); 907(c)(2)(E)(2) (2007) 
available at http://www.oil-gas.state.co.us. 
164 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(7) (2007). 
165 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(7) (2007). 
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covered only one of the 15 producing wells, only 1/15th of the water may be put to 
beneficial use, and the permit is conditioned on continued oil production.166   It took two 
and a half years for the Wellington operators to gather the required proof, submit it, and 
for the State Engineer to then verify that the water was non-tributary.167 
Once the company had a permit from the State Engineer, they sought a permit to 
discharge the treated water into unlined pits, which would serve as shallow aquifer 
recharge points. This discharge potentially implicated three different agencies: the 
COGCC (who regulates produced water discharges into lined pits), the Colorado Water 
Quality Control Division (who regulates surface discharges) and the EPA (who regulates 
Class V injection wells (including aquifer storage/recharge wells) in Colorado). The EPA 
defines a “well” as any “bored, drilled, or driven shaft whose depth is greater than the 
largest surface dimension; or, a dug hole whose depth is greater than the largest surface 
dimension . . . .”168 because the pits were shallow and wide, an EPA permit was not 
required. The discharge would be into “state waters” defined as “any and all surface and 
subsurface waters which are contained in or flow in or through this state . . .”169 which 
would presumably invoke the authority CWQCD.170 Surprisingly, the attorney for the 
WQCD (after conferring with the attorney for the COGCC) took the position that the 
COGCC had jurisdiction over discharge into groundwater of water produced from oil and 
gas operations, and that the CWQCD would only have jurisdiction if the discharges were 
                                                 
166 Water Rights of Wellington Water Works LLC, No. 2005CW343, 5 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1, Mar. 
10, 2008). 
167 See Sokoloski, supra note 156. The average review time at the State Engineer’s office for each 
submission was less than 3 months. Email from Dave McElhaney, P.G., Colorado State Engineer’s Office, 
to author (Mar. 3, 2008 10:43:00 EST) (on file with author). 
168 40 C.F.R. 144.3 (2008). 
169 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-8-103(19) (2007). 
170 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-8-501(1) (2007) (“No person shall discharge any pollutant into any state water 
from a point source without first having obtained a permit from the division for such discharge . . . .”). 
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made into “surface waters.”171 The CWQCD attorney reasoned that because the division 
was required by statute to “recognize water quality responsibilities of . . . “implementing 
agencies” [including] . . . the oil and gas conservation commission . . .,”172 the CWQCD 
was only responsible for setting appropriate discharge standards, while actual 
implementation would be left to the COGCC “after consultation with the [CWQCD] 
through their own programs.”173 The CWQCD was not, however, entitled to delegate any 
permitting responsibility for “the issuance and enforcement of permits authorizing point 
source discharges to surface waters of the state . . . ,”174 so any disposal not utilizing a pit 
or a well would require a CWQCD permit. After granting a variance to allow for the pit 
to be unlined, the COGCC granted the discharge permit.175 The total cost for permitting, 
engineering, and hydrological studies was over $1,000,000, but because the state 
agencies have now clarified their respective responsibilities, future projects should be on 
the order of $500,000.176 
The treatment plant went online in mid April 2006,177 but the final hurdle for the 
Wellington group was overcome in the Division One Water Court on January 15, 
2008.178  Nine statements of objection were originally filed, most by landowners that 
overlay the aquifer Wellington pumps from (as well as from the State Engineer), but only 
                                                 
171 In the Matter of a Request to Allow the Discharge of Treated Produced Water from the Wellington 
Muddy 108 Unit into the Box Elder Creek Alluvium, Larimer County, Colorado, No. 1-108 (Colo. Oil & 
Gas Conservation Comm’n Aug. 15, 2005). 
172 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-8-202(7) (2007). 
173 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-8-202(7)(a) (2007). 
174 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-8-202(7)(b)(I) (2007) (emphasis added). 
175 In the Matter of a Request to Allow the Discharge of Treated Produced Water from the Wellington 
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177 See Cherry Sokoloski, Water Users Contesting Wellington Oil Field Plan, NORTH FORTY NEWS, May, 
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one objector (a bank trust) remained when the case went to court.179 Wellington had 
originally sought a water right in the produced water under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-
137(7), but later modified its request to a decreed use right based on the permit obtained 
by the State Engineer.180 The court noted that when oil production ceased, Wellington 
could pursue a traditional water right in the same water under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-
137(4) (which governs most groundwater withdrawals) but this right would be based on 
the amount of land they owned (or land where they had consent from the landowner).181 
Regardless of these constraints, Wellington will still control the produced water for the 
foreseeable future. Because they own the mineral estate, no surface landowner can 
withdraw any of the non-tributary water/oil mixture. If, in a few hundred years the oil 
component of the water becomes depleted, Wellington will only need to file a timely 
request with the court to gain rights under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(4), ensuring their 
right to pump this groundwater until it is fully depleted.  
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case was the precedent it set in conflicts 
between overlying landowners who do not own the mineral rights and mineral producers 
who have permits under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(7). First, the court noted that until a 
well is constructed or a water right is adjudicated, rights in underlying non-tributary 
water are inchoate, and not considered a vested present interest, and not a constitutionally 
protected property interest.182 The court went on to state that 137(7) permits trumped 
                                                 
179 Water Rights of Wellington Water Works LLC, No. 2005CW343 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1, Mar. 
10, 2008). 
180 Id. At 2. 
181 Id.at 6. 
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inchoate rights, but failed to address how 137(7) permit withdrawals would be balanced 
against vested rights in non-tributary water.183 
 




As in Colorado, the Wyoming State Engineer’s Office is also responsible for the 
regulation and administration of water. Each water division has its own Water 
Superintendent; these superintendents and the State Engineer compose the Wyoming 
Board of Control (BOC), which adjudicates water rights and is the nearest analogue to 
the Colorado water court system.184  
Wyoming defines underground water as “any water . . . under the surface of the 
land or the bed of any stream, lake, reservoir, or other body of surface water . . .”185 A 
subset of groundwater is “byproduct water” defined as  
water which has not been put to prior beneficial use, and which is a by-
product of some non water-related economic activity and has been 
developed only as a result of such activity. By-product water includes, but 
is not limited to, water resulting from the operation of oil well separator 
systems or mining activities such as dewatering of mines.186 
 
Interestingly, Wyoming does not consider CBM water to be “byproduct 
water,” and in 1997 the Wyoming State Engineer also recognized that CBM 
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185 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-901(a)(ii) (2007). 
186 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-903 (2007). 
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dewatering was a beneficial use. The position was clarified in a 2004 memo, 
stating that 
 
CBM production is different than traditional natural gas production. It is 
similar in that the water is not the object of production; the methane 
reserve is the target. CBM production is different than conventional gas 
production due to the necessity for production of water for the production 
of the gas resource, thus the production of water is a requirement of the 
production cycle. The intentional production, or appropriation, of ground 
water for the CBM production led to the designation of CBM as a 
beneficial use of water and subsequently, to a requirement for a permit to 
appropriate the ground water.187 
 
Although the state has recognized CBM dewatering as a beneficial use, CBM 
operators benefit from a relatively streamlined well permitting process. The Wyoming 
SEO considers most CBM water to be unappropriated,188 and permits are granted as a 
matter of course.189 Although the permits are evaluated every five years and expire after 
gas production ceases, there is no limit to the amount of water that may be pumped.190 
                                                 
187 Wyoming State Engineer’s Office, Guidance: CBM/Ground Water Permits (Mar. 2004) available at 
http://seo.state.wy.us/PDF/GW_CBM%20Guidance.pdf. 
188 Patrick Tyrell, SEO policy: State Engineer’s Office Permitting Requirements for Water Produced 
During the Recovery of Coalbed Methane (CBNG), (Apr. 26, 2004) (stating that “water produced in the 
production of coalbed methane gas has no other implied use and is considered to be un-appropriated waters 
of the state of Wyoming.”) This streamlined permitting process has not escaped attention. In June 2007 two 
ranching families filed suit against the Wyoming State Engineer, alleging that “[t]he SEO categorically 
declares appropriation and production of ground water for CBM a ‘beneficial use’ of water . . . which 
allows junior ground water diverters to obtain permits for CBM production . . . . The SEO does not require 
applicants for CBM ground water or reservoirs to make a showing of no injury to vested water rights . . . .  
[And] [t]he majority of CBM ground water wells are never adjudicated before the [Wyoming Board of 
Control].” West v. Tyrrell, Civil Action No. 170-63 (1st Dist. Wyo. filed June 14, 2007). 
189Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-931 (2007). 
190 Form U.W. 5 is used for CBM wells. The phrase “[t]he amount of appropriation shall be limited to the 
quantity to which permittee is entitled as determined at time of proof of application to beneficial use”  is 
crossed out for CBM permits. Permit # 164824 at 2 (Andarko Petroleum) available at 
http://seo.state.wy.us/scans/GW_Docs/GW_Permits/Permits/D_P00164824_UW_002.pdf. Additionally, 
the CBM “additional conditions and limitations” section states that  “[n]o Proof of Appropriation and 
Beneficial Use of Ground Water form is required under this permit for the production of water associated 
with the production of natural gas. Beneficial use of ground water for the production of natural gas will be 
assumed as of the well completion date. In the event that water from this well is beneficially utilized for 
some purpose after natural gas production has ceased, the permittee is required to submit the appropriate 
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Recently, Wyoming has shown willingness to crack down on CBM producers 
whose wells are producing little or no gas.191 Current Colorado statutes would 
presumably prohibit this kind of waste as well,192 although Colorado has no official 
guidelines like the Wyoming threshold water-to-gas ratio of 10 barrels per Mcf.193 
 
ii. New Mexico 
 
Although New Mexico law classifies water used in the “prospecting, mining or 
drilling operations designed to discover or develop the natural resources of the state” as a 
beneficial use of the water, the state has never recognized CBM dewatering as a 
beneficial use.194 All appropriations of groundwater in “declared basins” require a permit 
from the State Engineer,195  but declared basins do not include any aquifer “the top of 
which . . .  is at a depth of twenty-five hundred feet or more below the ground surface . . . 
and which aquifer contains water containing not less than one thousand parts per million 
of dissolved solids.”196 This provision excludes most New Mexico CBM operations. In 
2004 the legislature further moved to define how CBM dewatering “fit” into the state’s 
water regulation rules, finding that 
                                                                                                                                                 
form(s) and documentation, as determined by the State Engineer, pertinent to the remaining use(s) specified 
under this permit. Such form(s) and documentation shall be submitted to the State Engineer within two (2) 
years of the cessation of natural gas production.” Permit # 164824 at 3 (Andarko Petroleum) available at 
http://seo.state.wy.us/scans/GW_Docs/GW_Permits/Permits/D_P00164824_UW_003.pdf. 
191 Wyoming State Engineer’s Office, Press Release, (Dec. 18, 2007) available at 
http://seo.state.wy.us/Press/2007/121807.aspx. 
192 The Colorado Groundwater Management Act does defines “waste” as “causing, suffering, or permitting 
any well to discharge water unnecessarily above or below the surface of the ground.” C.olo. Rev. Stat. 37-
90-103(20) (2007). Dewatering without methane extraction would presumably not be “necessary,” but no 
limit has yet been set on how much methane would need to be extracted to avoid statutory “waste.”  
193 This ratio must be achieved in the first two to three years of water production. See Wyoming State 
Engineer’s Office, supra note 191. 
194 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12-1 (LexisNexis 2007). 
195 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12-20 (LexisNexis 2007). 
196 N.M. Stat. Ann.  § 72-12-25 (LexisNexis 2007). 
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   (1) the production of minerals in New Mexico at times requires the 
diversion and associated treatment of large quantities of water; 
   (2) the diversion of water to permit mineral production is affected with a 
public interest; 
   (3) existing principles of prior appropriation, beneficial use and 
impairment of water rights, when applied to the diversion of water to 
permit mineral production, may cause severe economic hardship and 
impact to persons engaged in mineral production, to the owners of water 
rights and to the citizens of New Mexico; 
   (4) such hardship and impact are threats to the public health, safety and 
welfare and can be averted or minimized . . . 
 
The act explicitly states that mine dewatering is not “an appropriation of water 
nor waste . . .” and that “[n]o water rights may be established solely by mine 
dewatering.197 However, any mine dewatering in a designated basin does require a permit 
from the state engineer, who will examine existing water rights and determine if the 
dewatering would impair these rights.198 If no impairment exists, the permit shall issue, 
but if there would be some impairment the State Engineer would notify the applicant, 
who may propose a plan for replacement.199 Notably, if replacement water is required, the 
operator may propose that the produced water be the source.200  
Another bill in 2004 created a loophole that allows produced water to be used 
beneficially without obtaining a water right from the State Engineer. The provision states 
that “[n]o permit shall be required from the state engineer for the disposition of produced 
water in accordance with rules promulgated pursuant to section 70-2-12 NMSA by the 
Oil Conservation Division [OCD] of the energy minerals and natural resources 
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department.”201 The referenced statute is broad, allowing the OCD to “regulate the 
disposition of [produced] water . . . to direct surface or subsurface disposal . . . in a 
manner that will afford reasonable protection against contamination of fresh water 
supplies . . . .”202 OCD disposition rules are also broad, allowing disposal by injection 
wells, pits, or reuse, as well as “use in accordance with a division-issued use permit or 
other division authorization.”203  
In sum, New Mexico allows dewatering of brackish water below 2,500 feet 
without regulation from the State Engineer. If the dewatering takes place above 2,500 
feet, or is high quality water, a permit is required from the State Engineer, who will 
determine if the dewatering would cause any impairment to existing rights. In any case, 
dewatering may continue with a replacement plan, of which the produced water may be a 
source. With NMOCD approval, CBM operators may use the water for traditional 
beneficial uses without any further oversight from the SEO. Presumably the CBM 
producers could apply for a water right in the produced waters, but this additional step is 
not required in order to beneficially use produced water. 
 
III. A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
A. The Costs of CBM Produced Water Regulation 
 
New regulations on CBM produced water have three economic effects: (1) 
immediate, direct, quantifiable effects; (2) long term, indirect, or non-quantifiable effects; 
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and (3) secondary effects (such as behavior changes of stakeholders). For example, a 
statute mandating that produced water be treated to a low TDS level would have the 
direct effect of increasing production costs for CBM producers, possibly leading to lower 
production and lower federal royalty and state severance collection. Production decreases 
may cause the indirect effect of layoffs and depression of local economies. However, 
treatment mandates may also cause greater demand for treatment facilities and 
technology, with a secondary effect of lowering the cost of treatment industry-wide.  
Direct effects of CBM water regulation include increased production costs and 
corresponding reductions in economically recoverable resources. If these costs result in 
decreased production, tax revenues and royalties also decline. These types of direct 
economic impacts are generally quite easy to quantify. Table 3 lists the advantages and 
disadvantages of different water management options as well as their associated costs.204 
  
Table 3. Summary of Common Water Management Options 
 
Option Advantages Disadvantages Cost  
Direct Surface 
Discharge 





Available for livestock 
and wildlife 
Riparian erosion 
Deposition of salt 
Adverse effects on 
cropland 
Potential to alter natural 
surface water 
Impact to native aquatic 
species 







(lined or unlined pits) 







Mobilization of salts 
Potential for degradation 
of shallow aquifer 
Evaporation increases 
salinity 




impoundment in the 








Water not immediately 
available for additional 
beneficial 
Capital: $6,500-$15,000 
(reworking of existing 
well); $100,000 new 
                                                 
204 Modified from Wyoming Governor’s Report, supra note 26 and ALL 2006, supra note 8 at 27. 
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impacts from surface 
discharge 
surface use  
Some injection zones 




Deep Injection (Class II) 
Avoids environmental 
impacts for surface 
discharge 
Provides a source of 
water for enhanced 
oil/gas recovery projects 
If not properly 
completed water could 
migrate and impact 
higher quality aquifers 
Requires additional 
surface disturbance for 
well site, gathering 
systems, and surface 
storage 
Capital: $35,000-
$63,000 (reworking of 
existing well) 
$3,000,000-$4,000,000 






High quality water 
Produced 
Generation of 
concentrated brine  




$1,025,000 for treatment 
plant with commercial 
(off-site) disposal of 
brine; $750,000-










Removal of cations and 
bicarbonate 
Greater than 98% water 
recovery 
Generation of acidic 
brine  
(1-2% of influent) 
Does not remove anions 
O&M: $0.25/bbl-
$2.00/bbl (includes 
capital and permitting 
costs) 
 
Industry participants often have a good picture of disposal costs, production costs, 
and expected income based on forecast market prices and risks. For example, when 
Montana proposed Powder River Basin-wide rules that would allow for zero surface 
discharge of produced water unless the water was treated to contain less than 170 ppm 
TDS,205 industry-sponsored experts predicted that  
                                                 
205 Proposed Rule II is a “zero discharge” requirement applicable to the Montana Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (MPDES) program. This proposed new rule requires that “(1) except as provided in 
[New Rules III through IX], point-sources of methane wastewater shall achieve zero discharge of 
pollutants, which represents the minimum technology-based requirement. Zero discharge shall be 
accomplished by reinjection of methane wastewater into suitable geologic formations in the project area in 
compliance with all other applicable federal and state laws and regulations.” The rule does provide a means 
to obtain an exemption from the injection requirement, but timeframes to obtain an exemption may be 
greater than 12 months as the rule is currently proposed. Proposed Rule VIII establishes “treatment-based 
effluent limitations” for CBNG produced water. The proposed rule requires that “If the department grants a 
waiver from the zero discharge requirement for all or a portion of the wastewater pursuant to [New Rules II 
and III], the amount of wastewater that obtains the waiver shall achieve the following minimum 
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Implementation of the new rules would significantly impede and/or likely 
cause the cessation of current and future CBNG development in the 
Wyoming portion of the [Powder River Basin]. Implementing a zero 
discharge requirement likely would reduce production by 25 percent 
immediately upon enforcement of the rule. Within one year of 
implementation, production rates are expected to decrease by as much as 
50 percent. Within five years, production likely would decline by 90 
percent, eliminating much (if not all) of the potential production in the 
region.”206 
 
A 2006 study in Wyoming prepared for the Department of Energy was slightly 
less alarmist, but echoed studies in other states in finding that 
 
The choice of the water disposal and management option directly impacts 
the volume of economically producible CBM from the Powder River 
Basin . . . . Progressively more stringent water disposal and management 
options also reduce federal, state and local tax receipts that would accrue 
from royalty and production tax payments on CBM production.207 
 
However, the study recognized that these negative economic effects did not vary 
linearly with gas price; “[a]t lower wellhead natural gas prices, the impact of 
progressively more stringent water disposal options is more severe; at higher wellhead 
natural gas prices, the impact is less severe as progressively more costly water 
management practices can be accommodated at the economic threshold used in the 
model.”208 As the figure below shows, stringent water disposal regulation (i.e. treatment 
                                                                                                                                                 
technology-based effluent limitations at the end of the pipe prior to discharge: . . . total dissolved solids 
average concentration of 170 mg/L . . . .” See ALL 2006 supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 32-
33. 
206 Id. 
207 Gregory C. Bank & Vello A. Kuuskraa, The Economics of Powder River Basin Coalbed Methane 





vs. surface discharge) lowers the amount of gas that can be economically recovered, but 
as gas prices rise, nearly the same amount of gas is economically recoverable regardless 
of the water disposal option.209 
 
Figure 3. Estimated Relationship of Wellhead Natural Gas Prices to Economically 





In 2001, the Montana Coalbed Natural Gas Alliance presented a study of how 
CBM production would affect the area from 2000 through 2022. The report concluded 
that the economic benefits to Montana would include $253.5 million in royalties to 
Montana schools; $426 million in royalties to the Montana state general fund, $982 
million in production tax paid to Montana for schools, state and local governments and 
                                                 
209 Wellhead prices for October, 2007 were $6.25/Mcf. U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. 
Natural Gas Wellhead Prices, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3M.htm. The U.S. Department 




other agencies; and $1.3 billion in purchases of local goods and services.211 The 
development would create up to 736 jobs worth $326 million in total wages and benefits, 
for a total economic benefit of $4.1 billion. While the study was comprehensive in its 
examination of benefits, many costs were addressed less thoroughly. Under the 
“environmental impacts” section, the study noted that “[t]he environmental impacts of the 
development are currently under evaluation. Any impacts identified would require 
mitigation. All costs of mitigation would be the responsibility of the producers.”212 
The Powder River Basin studies are compelling, and the negatives associated with 
stringent water regulation take more force when coupled with indirect negative effects on 
local communities. Lower resource exploitation decreases employment and tax revenues 
to local communities, something state politicians should be keenly aware of. However, 
the negative effects (both direct and indirect) may only slow, rather than preclude gas 
extraction. Assuming gas prices will continue to rise in the future and recovery and 
treatment technology will advance, the negative effect may only be temporary. As prices 
rise, more gas becomes economically recoverable, more wells will be drilled, more jobs 
are created, and more taxes collected. The net direct effects of stringent regulation on the 
already established CBM industry may be temporarily significant but relatively minor in 
the long term. In addition, U.S. industry voiced similar woes in 1970 over the passage of 
the Clean Air Act. Since that time, air pollutants have been significantly decreased (more 
                                                 
211 Anderson ZurMuehlen and Co., P.C, Coalbed Methane Development, Powder River Basin of Montana: 
Economic and Social Impacts of Proposed Development, (June 1, 2001) (prepared for the Montana Coalbed 
Natural Gas Alliance) available at http://www.deq.state.mt.us/CoalBedMethane/pdf/cbm2.pdf. 
212 Id. 
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than 50% for the most common types) while U.S. gross domestic product has tripled, 
energy consumption had increased by 50%, and vehicle use had increased by 200%.213 
Stringent regulation may, however, slow the development of new recovery 
technology. One of the most interesting recovery technologies to emerge in the last 
decade is enhanced CBM (ECBM) recovery, which uses gas injection (carbon dioxide or 
nitrogen) to increase methane desorption. Analysts have estimated that this process may 
allow for 150 Tcf additional recovery of methane in the United States and would 
sequester over 90 billion tons (90Gt) of carbon dioxide214 (in 2004, global carbon dioxide 
emissions totaled 26.9 Gt215). The process requires a pattern of injection wells drilled into 
a producing coal seam around a central production well. The mechanics of the recovery 
depend on which gas is used: Carbon dioxide has a strong affinity for coal, followed by 
methane and then nitrogen.216 When nitrogen is introduced into coal fractures, it displaces 
methane and lowers the partial pressure of the methane gas.217 This disequilibrium 
“strips” methane from the coal, and the nitrogen/methane mixture can be removed and 
separated.218 In carbon dioxide ECBM recovery, the carbon dioxide replaces methane due 
to differences in affinity for the coal surface, this produces large amounts of methane that 
would not otherwise be recoverable, but the process is much slower than with nitrogen.219 
Carbon dioxide sorption lowers the permeability of the coal seams, which helps to 
                                                 
213 U.S. Env. Protection Agency, Understanding the Clean Air Act, 
http://epa.gov/oar/caa/peg/understand.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). 
214 Id.  
215 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, International Energy Outlook 2007, DOE/EIA-0484 (May 2007) available at 
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html. 
216 See Scott Reeves, Assessment of CO2 Sequestration and ECBM Potential of U.S. Coalbeds DE-FC26-
00NT40924, (Feb. 2003) (Prepared for the U.S. Dep’t of Energy) available at http://www.adv-
res.com/Carbon-Sequestration.asp. 




explain why equivalent volumes of the two gases injected into two test sites in the San 
Juan Basin yielded a 57% increased daily recovery for nitrogen, but only a 29% increase 
for carbon dioxide.220 Although the nitrogen process is faster and more productive than 
the carbon dioxide process, the carbon dioxide process does not require expensive gas 
separators on production wells and has the added benefit of sequestering large amounts of 
greenhouse gases. Because ECBM technology has little effect on produced water 
volumes (and may even cause the produced water to contain higher concentrations of 
some contaminants) the technology may be stifled by stringent produced water 
regulation.221 
The final piece in understanding the economics of produced water regulation has to 
do with time and risk. Oil and gas extraction requires significant capital costs, and 
treatment and disposal increase these costs. Delays in permitting can pose extensive costs 
to operators, and risks (both market and regulatory) are factored into decisions. In a 
produced waters workshop held in 2006, Dr. Jeff Cline, the Water Programs Manager at 
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (one of the largest CBM producers in Wyoming) said: 
 
Oil and gas development is an investment. That’s important to keep in 
perspective. . . . One thing that’s very difficult and costly is the time 
required – years – to obtain the authorizations. Time is money. It can take 
sometimes several years to get an NPDES permit, and then the permit 
requirements change because of moving regulatory requirements. . . . It’s a 
risky business for us. High price volatility for the product [also] equals 
high economic risk. For coalbed natural gas . . . the price has varied from 
$0.80 to $7.00 per thousand cubic feet during the last three years. That’s 
high risk. You have to make all this investment up front, well before you 
know what price you’re going to get for your product. CBNG competes 
                                                 
220 Id. 
221 See Green Car Congress, Factors and Impacts for CO2 Storage in Coalbed Seams, (June 24, 2007) 
available at http://www.greencarcongress.com/2007/06/factors-and-imp.html. 
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with other investment opportunities; therefore, if the gas risk/reward is too 
high, we go to other investments with lower risk/reward.222 
 
Cline identifies two key concepts in his comments. First, oil and gas 
development exists in a highly volatile energy market, which means that 
administrative delays make projects more costly (which may then preclude 
expensive water disposal techniques). Second, regulatory uncertainty is a risk that 
can increases the projected cost of water treatment technology.  The following 
table represents the relative cost and risk associated with different water disposal 
options from Cline’s perspective: 
 
Option Cost Economic Risk 
Injection Med-High Low 
Impoundment Low-Med Med-High 
Irrigation Med Med 
Minor Treatment/Discharge Low High 
Major Treatment/Discharge Very High Low-Med 
 
In support of the above framework, Cline offered the following 
explanation: 
 
. . . I consider minor treatment and discharge as a high economic risk 
[because] the regulations are changing constantly.. . . . A production 
engineer will first opt for injecting the coalbed natural gas produced water 
and conventional produced water when it’s feasible. That’s the lowest risk 
option. It’s the only thing he can take advantage of. We want to support 
the local community and help out ranchers by giving them water, we 
really do. But, it must be a low-risk strategy. If the regulatory environment 
makes it higher risk, it does not make sense to do it. We need to really 
have certainty here [in order to] manage beneficial use water as a 
resource, not a waste . . . . 223 
                                                 
222 Jeff Cline, Opportunities and Liabilities for Produced Waters, Produced Water Workshop 36, 39 
(emphasis added), available at 
http://cwrri.colostate.edu/Produced%20Waters/Proceedings%20Final%20PDF.pdf. 
223 Id.  
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Regulatory uncertainty may help to explain why producers would choose to spend $3 
to 4 million dollars to drill class II injection well and spend $0.50 to $1.75 per barrel to 
operate the well rather than building a treatment plant for $450,000 to $1,270,000 with 
operation costs between $0.26 and $0.34 per barrel.224 There is little chance that class II 
well requirements would change, but water quality discharge standards might, leaving 
producers with an obsolete treatment plant. 
The above examples show the complexity in evaluating the costs of CBM produced 
water regulation. Direct and indirect costs are generally quantifiable and immediately 
apparent, but may be mitigated by rising natural gas prices. Beneficial carbon 
sequestration projects may also be hindered by stringent regulation. Finally, constant 
legislative changes, or schemes that involve long permitting timeframes have a direct 
economic impact on produced water disposal options, possibly precluding the most 
desirable choice. 
 
B. Benefits of CBM Produced Water Regulation 
 
The direct benefits of regulating CBM produced water include environmental 
protection and protection of vested water rights. Because regulation can slow or stop 
CBM development, groundwater resources are also preserved, which is a major benefit in 
the arid west.  
Due to the slow recharge of many aquifers, the removal of relatively high quality 
water with subsequent injection into deep saline aquifers or surface dumping is a long 
                                                 
224 See table 3, supra. 
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term consequence of CBM development. Because CBM has been commercially exploited 
only recently, many of the negative effects (especially those relating to aquifer 
depletions) are not fully understood, and many of the scientific studies on the subject 
remain highly controversial.225 In 2004, economists with the Science and Environmental 
Health Network226 conducted a study examining the effects of CBM development on the 
Powder River Basin.227 The authors believed that the precautionary principle228 dictated 
that all costs of CBM development be examined, including the value of lost water 
resources and state and federal subsidies to the oil and gas industry. The study concluded 
that CBM development would result in loss of water resources valued at $2.1 to $10.1 
billion and $50 million for household well deepening due to lower groundwater tables. 
The study also identified the federal and state tax credits producers would receive over 
the next five years, including: 
 
Section 29 tax credit: $676 million – $1.57 billion 
Percentage depletion credit: $9.8 million – $38.1 million 
Expensing development costs: $21.4 million – $42.8 million 
Research subsidies: $11 million 
Total federal tax breaks: $707 million – $1.65 billion 
 
                                                 
225 See Memorandum from Deborah Hathaway, & Bryan Grigsby to Dick Wolfe, Responses to Review 
Comments of Coalbed Methane Stream Depletion Assessment Study, February 2006  (Sept. 27, 2006) 
available at http://www.water.state.co.us/pubs/pdf/CBMCommentsResponses.pdf 
226 SEHN (Science and Environmental Health Network) was founded in 1994 by a consortium of North 
American environmental organizations (including the Environmental Defense Fund, The Environmental 
Research Foundation, and OMB Watch) concerned about the misuse of science in ways that failed to 
protect the environment and human health. SEHN has been the leading proponent in the United States of 
the Precautionary Principle as a new basis for environmental and public health policy. About SEHN: 
History and Mission, http://www.sehn.org/about.html. 
227 J. Skov and N. Myers, Easy Money, Hidden Costs, Applying Precautionary Economic Analysis to 
Coalbed Methane in the Powder River Basin (June, 2004) available at 
http://www.sehn.org/tccpdf/coalbed%20methane%20costs%20Powder%20River.pdf. 
228 The authors define the principle as stated in the Wingspread Conference of 1998:  
“Where an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures 
should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.” Id. 
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This study (and the precautionary principle in general) are not without their 
critics.229 Roger Coupal, of the University of Wyoming Department of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics summarized the problems with the use of the precautionary principle 
in the study as follows: 
 
The principle, as usually applied, claims to balance risk with economic 
efficiency issues. This analysis does not do that . . . . in this case the risk of 
running out of water is not balanced with the risk associated with 
substantially depressed economies from the loss of gas production, the 
fiscal losses in providing education and public services, and the poverty 
that comes with it. So to be balanced . . . there should [be a] comparison of 
the risks associated with non-development, or poverty-based development, 
that would come with non-mineral development. It is important to 
consider that there are risks inherent in development and risks inherent in 
not developing.230 
 
Coupal also took issue with valuing water that may be of poor quality using 
market prices (the study assumed local prices of $258 to $600 per acre-foot). Although 
these prices may be excessive, even assuming that local prices for agricultural water are 
on the order of $25 per acre-foot (much lower than the $65 Coupal uses for his 
calculations) and only 25% of the water is of high enough quality to use for agriculture, 
the cumulative 589,000 acre-feet of water taken out of the Powder River Basin by the end 
of 2007231 would be a resource loss of over 3.68 million dollars. This number is nowhere 
near $10.1 billion, but still shows that the numbers involved are not trivial. Significant 
                                                 
229 Julian Morris of the International Policy Network in London was quoted as saying  “[i]f someone had 
evaluated the risk of fire right after it was invented they may well have decided to eat their food raw.” 
STEVEN G. GILBERT, A SMALL DOSE OF TOXICOLOGY: THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF COMMON CHEMICALS 238 
(CRC Press 2004).  
230Roger Coupal, Review of Economic Issues Associated with CBM Development (2005) (Technical 
Support Document prepared for the University of Wyoming’s Ruckelshaus Institute of Environment and 
Natural Resources) available at http://www.uwyo.edu/enr/ienr/Projects/Coupal2005.pdf. See also supra 
note 23. 
231 See Figure 4. 
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increases in demand (caused by increasing populations), reductions in supply (caused by 
climate changes and drought), and decreased cost of treatment (caused by new 
technology) seem to indicate that the resource loss may well be in the billions, and in any 
case, should be a factor in any cost benefit analysis. 
Because the effect of aquifer depletion is unknown and potentially severe, some 
have called for CBM producers to bear the burden of fully restoring aquifers after gas 
extraction. This would presumably be accomplished with “immediate reinjection” of 
produced waters back into coal seam aquifers. Some commentators have touted this as 
the solution to the produced water problem because it would eliminate the full range of 
discharge/disposal issues, including surface damage to drainage ecosystems, waters, and 
soils as well as loss of coalbed aquifer pressure, which has been linked to methane seeps, 
coalbed fires, and surface subsidence.232 Essentially, “immediate reinjection” would  
completely solve CBM water issues, but it is both technologically and economically 
infeasible in most instances. First, in order to produce methane, coal seams must be 
dewatered. Immediate reinjection into the same coal seam would effectively preclude 
methane extraction, so “reinjection” into the producing coal seam would have to occur at 
geologically distant locations. Because most CBM coal seams exist at a saturated state, 
the only possible reinjection sites would be spent production wells (converted into coal 
seam injection wells). Although this would require extensive piping, the real problem is 
the timing of CBM water production. Consider the Powder River Basin, one of the first 
                                                 
232 Thomas J. Schneider, Coalbed Methane Produced Water Reinjection, (May 16, 2001) (prepared for the 
Northern Plains Resource Council) available at 
http://www.deq.state.mt.us/CoalBedMethane/pdf/SchneiderPaper5-16-01.PDF 
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commercially viable CBM fields. The first wells came online in the mid 1980s, and have 









As figure 4 demonstrates, assuming a best case scenario where (1) all wells stop 
producing and can be converted to injection wells after 10 years; (2) each injection well 
                                                 
233 Black Diamond Energy, a producer in the basin states that  “[t]he life of a coalbed methane well depends 
on the distance from its neighboring wells (spacing of the well field), how wells communicate with each 
other in the subsurface, and the amount of gas available to each well. These and other factors for Wyoming 
low rank coals are not entirely understood and are still being studied. Most of the producers in the Powder 
River Coal Field expect that a coalbed methane well can produce for 10 to 12 years. As a coalbed in the 
original production zone is drained of its methane, the well often can be reworked to produce gas from 
lower coalbeds. Depending on the situation, multiple coalbeds could extend the life of a well site by 10 to 
30 years.” Rodney H. De Bruin, Robert M. Lyman, Richard W. Jones, & Lance W. Cook, Coalbed 
Methane in Wyoming, http://blackdiamondenergy.com/coalbed2.html#. 
234 This is a compilation of data from the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, which lists 
production statistics on its  website.  http://wogcc.state.wy.us/  “statistics” 
59 
can receive the same amount of water it produced; and (3) piping within the basin is 
possible; immediate reinjection does not become a viable solution until 2010 or later.235 
While immediate reinjection may be a partial solution at present, natural recharge, piping 
costs, injection issues and longer well life would preclude it from being a total solution 
until many years into the future. Indeed, a recent report by Sandia National Laboratories 
concluded that  
 
While some reinjection in the Montana and Wyoming Powder River Basins is 
feasible, the overall success is . . . less than 30% . . . . [This] would require roughly 
three injection wells drilled for one successful injection well with very substantial 
environmental disturbance in the form of surface disturbance, air emissions, noise, 
and vehicle traffic.236 
 
The above examples all relate to economic and technological feasibility and accurate 
cost benefit analyses to quantify the impact of CBM extraction on the region. In some 
cases, however, the total public value of the CBM produced water may be more than the 
value of the gas itself, especially with rising water prices in the West. A study conducted 
by Coupal and Peck in 2003 modeled a hypothetical field in the Powder River Basin.237 
Although the study was regional and not meant to be a comprehensive statewide analysis, 
the authors did compare benefits (labor income over the life of the play and local tax 
revenues) to costs (production costs, local government costs of the extra economic 
activity, an estimate of overall opportunity cost of lost water in terms economic 
                                                 
235 First, draw a horizontal line from the cumulative water production line at any given date and project it 
forward ten years. Where the annual water production line is at or below the projected line, total immediate 
reinjection is theoretically feasible. 
236 Sandia National Laboratories, Technical Review of Proposed Changes in Montana Water Quality 
Standards for Coalbed Natural Gas Produced Water, SAND2006-0312 (Jan. 2006) at 19, available at 
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/coalbed_methane/sandia_report.pdf. 
237 Roger Coupal & D. Peck, Coalbed Methane Development in the Powder River Basin, Northeast 
Wyoming: A Regional Investment Analysis.(2003), (Unpublished report for Johnson and Campbell 
Counties, Wyoming).  
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development potential, spillover effects on surface owners, and economic impacts on 
wildlife seasonal range). The analysis concluded that the public benefits in terms of labor 
income and tax revenue exceeded the costs of development, including the opportunity 
cost of water at present. Based on the same factors, however, the study estimated that the 
breakeven value of water was just under $700 per acre-foot. This value implies that if 
there is a willing buyer of the water for $700 per acre-foot or higher, then given the 
assumptions of the model it is worth more for the region to develop the water than the 
gas. Although not a perfect comparison, this model would seem to explain the Wellington 
oilfield project. By using a discount rate of 4-10%, and viewing the $700 as a perpetual 
annuity, the figure may be converted to a water right with a value from $7,000 to 
$21,000, which is below the range of water right prices in the Wellington area ($16,000 
to $33,000 after treatment costs).238 Indeed, the chief constraint of the Coupal study was 
the assumption that there would always be a willing buyer for the produced water 
(unlikely inside the Powder River Basin). Anecdotal evidence indicates that finding a 
willing buyer of water from Wyoming, especially in Colorado’s front range, may not be 
that difficult.239 
 
IV. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION? 
 
The current statutes regulating produced water from oil and gas operations were 
mostly written in the 1950s to handle highly saline wastewater from conventional oil and 
                                                 
238Stewart email, supra note 161. 
239 In correspondence with Dr. Dave Stewart, the author posed the question “[a]re there any ways the laws 
could be improved to make this type of beneficial use more attractive to Oil and Gas companies?” to which 
he replied “Wyoming has a law that prevents the movement of over 1,000 af/yr out of state.  This will need 
to be modified in the future to utilize this resource.” Id.  
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gas extraction from deep formations. As the Vance case and the Wellington oilfield 
example demonstrate, applying these statutes to beneficial uses of produced water can be 
problematic, especially when the produced water is relatively high quality CBM water 
from shallower aquifers. Montana, Utah, and New Mexico treat CBM produced water 
similarly to traditional oil and gas waste, but Wyoming and Colorado (after Vance) view 
CBM dewatering as a beneficial use. Treating the water the same as traditional oil and 
gas waste (with regulation by the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission) is problematic 
for three reasons: (1) oil and gas conservation commissions are concerned with 
preventing waste of oil and gas, not the waste of water resources; (2) these commissions 
are not equipped to adjudicate water rights or protect the water rights of senior 
appropriators; and (3) classifying water that often meets drinking water quality with 
highly saline oilfield waste makes little sense.240 The “beneficial use” model (with 
concurrent regulation by the State Engineer) (1) does not account for the fact that the 
massive quantities and sometimes marginal quality of the produced water could never be 
beneficially used in the traditional sense;241 and (2) assuming this is a “beneficial use” 
means that it cannot be “waste” which may present state constitutional issues.242  
                                                 
240 See Thomas F. Darin, Waste or Wasted? - Rethinking the Regulation of Coalbed Methane Byproduct 
Water in the Rocky Mountains: A Comparative Analysis of Approaches  to Coalbed Methane Produced 
Water Quantity Legal Issues in Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, Montana and Wyoming, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 281 (Fall 2002). 
241 Darin noted that “[t]he Powder River Basin has a total of 500,000 cattle and sheep. As previously 
discussed, one cow, or seven sheep, drinks about 14.5 gallons per day. At peak production of 51,000 wells 
at 9.5 gpm, this will amount to nearly 700 million gallons per day. At this rate, for this use alone to account 
for all of the produced water, the Powder River Basin would be overrun with over 45 million cows or 325 
million sheep.” Id. at 330. 
242 Id. 
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 There is little reason to believe that a legislative solution that would avoid both 
sets of problems is impossible.243 Because the specific statutory regimes for 
administering water and handling produced water vary between western states, 
examining specific states’ regulatory frameworks is most appropriate. For the purpose of 
this paper (and for the sake of brevity) Colorado is chosen as an example state.244 Two 
statutory changes and one COGCC rule change are outlined and evaluated in terms of 
their economic, legal, and political feasibility. 
 
A. Colorado Statutory Changes 
 
Just as the doctrine of prior appropriation first emerged in Colorado, a legislative 
solution to coalbed methane produced water will may emerge there as well. In any case, 
the state will pass legislation on the subject soon.245 The Vance case has highlighted the 
                                                 
243 Gary Bryner took Darin’s ideas a step further and proposed legislative recommendations that would 
encourage subsequent beneficial use of CBM produced water in western states: (1) clarify instances where 
producers would own rights in the produced water (which would encourage producers to find beneficial 
uses of the water in order to market it); (2) require water management plans as part of every major CBM 
development to ensure that water rights are protected and that produced water is not wasted; (3) establish 
standards for protecting surface waters and aquifers to ensure that the quality of CBM water is equal to or 
better quality than that which it impacts; and (4) specify beneficial uses of CBM water, such as bolstering 
seasonal flows of rivers, irrigation, and aquifer recharge. Gary Bryner, Article: Coalbed Methane 
Development in the Intermountain West: Producing Energy and Protecting Water, 4 WYO. L. REV. 541, 
555-57 (2004). 
244 Colorado was chosen for five reasons: (1) the Vance case discussed earlier presents the applicable 
statutes in depth; (2) the state will likely pass legislation on the subject in 2008; (3) the values and 
perceptions of the stakeholders are similar to each of the western states (i.e. a Colorado rancher is much 
like a Wyoming rancher and a Colorado CBM producer is much like a Utah CBM producer); (4) Colorado 
is home to multiple CBM basins that vary in depth and water quality, so a CBM solution there could serve 
as a model for other states with less variety; (5) Colorado is a central state, with most of its CBM basins 
crossing into other states (i.e. a solution to the CBM produced water from the Raton basin could be a model 
for New Mexico, and a solution for the Uinta could serve as a model for Wyoming and Utah). 
245 In September 2007, Sen. Jim Isgar, chairman of the Colorado Water Resources Review Committee, said, 
“[f]or years, we’ve tossed around whether we should do legislation . . . maybe the time has come.” Joe 
Hanel, Local Well Ruling Looms Over State: Order Could Affect Thousands, DURANGO HERALD, 
September 13, 2007, available at http://durangoherald.com/asp-
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issue, and the authority of legislators to implement a solution to the coalbed methane 
produced water problem is enshrined in the Colorado Constitution, which provides that 
“[t]he general assembly may make such regulations from time to time, as may be 
necessary for the proper and equitable drainage of mines.”246 The three proposals below 
may provide a partial solution to the problem. 
 
 
i. Codify CBM Dewatering as “Beneficial Use” in Order to 
Force Cost Internalization and Protect Vested Rights 
 
New Colo. Rev. Stat. § § 37-92-103(4): “Beneficial use” shall also include the 
reasonable diversion of groundwater to facilitate the production of coalbed methane.” 
 
In a comprehensive hydrologic study completed for the San Juan Basin, engineers 
determined that the estimated 3,000 acre-feet or produced water depleted surface streams 
by 156 acre-feet annually.247 Depletion will not drop below 50 acre-feet annually until 
after 2300.248 In the Raton Basin, the numbers are much higher: 16,000 acre-feet of 
annual dewatering depletes surface streams by 2,500 acre-feet annually.249 Because the 
water withdrawn is classified as waste and regulated solely by the COGCC, producers do 
not bear the cost of these depletions (or, as mentioned above, the loss of resource 
                                                                                                                                                 
bin/article_generation.asp?article_type=news&article_path=/news/07/news070913_3.htm; See also Wolfe 
interview, supra note 34. 
246 Colo. Const. Article XVI §3. 
247 See Papadopulos, supra note 82. 
248 Id.  
249 Dick Wolfe, Colorado State Engineer, before the Colorado Water Resources Review Committee (Sep. 
12, 2007) available at 
http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/lcsstaff/2007/comsched/07WaterResources0912agd.htm. 
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value).250  The first step in any statutory reform would be forcing producers to bear the 
cost of depletions. Despite recent reforms to the COGCC, 251 this would best be 
accomplished utilizing the existing state water administration regime.252 In Vance, the 
court invoked the jurisdiction of the SEO and the state water court system. These two 
bodies are uniquely competent in this area and are the only acceptable choice to 
determine injury to senior rights and adjudicate methods to prevent such injury.253 
Because of the uncertainties in scope of the Vance holding,254 a statutory definition 
limiting beneficial use to CBM dewatering is required to exclude the approximately 
                                                 
250 Valuing this resource is troublesome. The stream depletion study notes that “[v]ery little CBM water is 
used for beneficial purposes, in part because the quality of the water in the Fruitland-Pictured Cliffs aquifer 
in most of the Colorado portion of the San Juan Basin is too poor for most uses that involve a sizeable and 
relatively continuous supply of water . . . . [and] because of the relatively low demand for water for local 
municipal and industrial supply purposes, it is unlikely that the construction of the necessary infrastructure 
to treat/transfer water to points of use in the basin will be economically feasible in the near future.” Based 
on this analysis, the water may have a low or even negative value, but what is the value of the resource in 
the year 2300? See Papadopulos, supra note 82. 
251Colorado House Bill 1341 Reforms the composition of the oil and gas commission so that the oil and gas 
industry is no longer guaranteed a majority of seats and requires the commission to avoid and minimize 
damage to the environment, wildlife resources and public health. The two new members include the 
executive director of the Department of Natural Resources and the executive director of the Colorado 
Department of Public Health and Environment. The remaining seven members include: Three from the oil 
and gas industry (of which two shall have college degrees in petroleum geology or petroleum engineering); 
one local government official; one with a background in environmental or wildlife protection; one with a 
background in soil conservation or reclamation; and one with a background in agriculture who is also a 
royalty owner (read: rancher with CBM operators on his property). H.R. 1341, 66th Leg., 1st Sess. (2007). 
Colorado House Bill 1298 makes protecting wildlife resources part of the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission’s mission and ensures that the Division of Wildlife plays a more prominent role in protecting 
wildlife in the face of oil and gas development. H.R. 1298, 66th Leg., 1st Sess. (2007). 
252 While single agency oversight is certainly desirable, augmentation plans are complex matters, requiring 
replacement water to be delivered in the correct manner, time, and location. Although recent reforms have 
made the COGCC more sympathetic to environmental and water concerns, water administration is simply 
not the role of the COGCC. The COGCC does allow for public participation in drill permitting decisions, 
but the Commission is not the appropriate forum for determinations of material injury to vested water 
rights.  
253 Forcing internalization of costs was likely one of the motivations of the court in Vance, where the court 
found  CBM dewatering to be a beneficial use despite relatively clear statutory evidence that the legislature 
never intended this outcome, at least in non-tributary situations. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(7) (2007). 
254 By classifying dewatering as an “appropriation,” the jurisdiction of the SEO and the water courts are 
invoked, but this outcome potentially subjects all oil and gas operations that produce any water to this same 
jurisdiction. This is hardly what the legislature had in mind when it created the COGCC, and one would 
have a hard time arguing that the SEO and water courts should have any oversight for traditional oil and 
gas operations that produce and immediately reinject brine from deep formations. 
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30,000 conventional oil and gas wells in the state from the SEO’s jurisdiction and the 
appropriation system.255  
 
ii. Introduce a Tributary/Non-Tributary Distinction in Order 
to Reduce Administrative Hurdles for Desirable Projects  
 
 New Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(7)) would contain the following exception:  
“(c) For the purposes of this subsection (7), groundwater from the following 
aquifers shall be presumed to be non-tributary: 
(1) the top the aquifer is at a depth of twenty-five hundred feet or more below 
the ground surface at any location at which a well is drilled; and 
(2)  the aquifer contains water not less than ten thousand parts per million of 
dissolved solids.” 
 
In order to increase sustainable development and beneficial use, statutory exemptions 
for CBM operators are required. After legislatively clarifying the Vance holding, CBM 
operators withdrawing tributary water would be on equal footing with traditional 
appropriators. They would need well permits and plans to replace any water required to 
prevent material injury to senior appropriators. Conceptually, requiring this type of cost 
internalization makes sense when the water is like surface water (high quality, easily 
accessible, and fit for a variety of uses), but the logic breaks down when the produced 
water starts to resemble traditional oil and gas waste (low quality, difficult to extract, and 
unfit for most traditional uses). At some point, the produced water shifts from an asset to 
                                                 
255 See Hanel, supra note 245. 
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a liability, which should be captured in any proposed legislation. The simplest way to 
accomplish this is to define instances when CBM operators may be afforded the benefit 
of the more generous non-tributary mine dewatering statute, which still requires the SEO 
determine that there be no material injury to senior appropriators, but not that 
augmentation plans be filed as a matter of course in fully appropriated basins.256 
Currently, all Colorado groundwater is presumed to be tributary unless proven 
otherwise with hydrologic facts.257 Unless the aquifer in question has already been 
proven to be non-tributary, this generally involves a costly report from a hydrologic 
engineer and a lengthy review by the SEO. The entire process could take years and cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and was a major hurdle in the Wellington oilfield 
project. The TDS/depth limit described above would better delineate tributary and non-
tributary areas – produced water with TDS higher than 10,000 mg/L258 and well below 
the range of most domestic or livestock watering wells (2,500 ft)259 would carry a 
presumption of being non-tributary. This TDS/depth limit would also mirror hydrologic 
facts: in general, non-tributary groundwater is deeper and of lower quality than tributary 
groundwater. 
Recall that New Mexico has a provision similar to the one proposed above: aquifers 
below 2,500 feet that contain nonpotable water are outside the jurisdiction of the State 
Engineer. If appropriators can prove the water is of low quality, below 2,500 feet, and 
                                                 
256 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137(7) (2007). 
257See Platte Valley Irrigation Co. v. Buckers Irrigation, Milling, & Improvement Co., 53 P. 334 (Colo. 
1898). 
258 10,000 mg/L is the number typically cited for “usable” or “high” quality water. See ALL 2006 supra 
note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 5 (“High quality water with a total dissolved solids (TDS) 
concentration of less than 10,000 parts per million (ppm) may be employed for an assortment of beneficial 
uses, providing recreational opportunities, drinking water for stock and wildlife, irrigation water in arid 
regions, and a supplemental source for municipal water supplies.”). 
259 Most domestic water wells in the San Juan Basin do not exceed 400 ft. Wolfe interview, supra note 34. 
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unconnected to shallower aquifers, they may mine the water without oversight. The 
loophole is unpopular with the New Mexico State Engineer, however, who fears that 
unregulated mining of these aquifers by developers and water-hungry municipalities 
could impact shallower aquifers in the future.260 The provision is also unpopular with 
some legislators – a 2007 bill that would close the loophole failed in the Senate 11-31 
after the State Oil Conservation Division stated that the bill would involve “hazards of 
agency conflict” and interfere with “[t]he authority of OCD to authorize injection into 
deep aquifers . . .”261  
 Neither of New Mexico’s concerns would apply in Colorado. The SEO and the 
COGCC already have concurrent jurisdiction over all non-designated aquifers, so 
introducing a statutory definition of non-tributary dewatering would not raise 
jurisdictional concerns. Further, if the TDS/depth limitation was qualified as applicable 
only for mine dewatering, there would be no means for municipalities or developers to 
use the distinction to their advantage. 
 
 
iii. Allow for Class V Injection 
 
New COGCC Rule 907(c)(2) (listing disposal methods for produced water) add:262  
                                                 
260 Staci Matlock, Nature Holds Trump Card with Water Rights, THE NEW MEXICAN (Sep. 15, 2007) 
available at http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/68605.html. 
261 S. 1169, 48th Leg. 1st Sess. (N.M. 2007) (Fiscal Impact Rep.) available at 
http://legis.state.nm.us/Sessions/07%20Regular/firs/SB1169.html. 
262 Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, Rules and Regulations 907(c)(2) (2007), http://www.oil-
gas.state.co.us. 
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“(F) Injection into a properly permitted Class V well in accordance with the rules and 
regulations of the Water Quality Control Division (“WQCD”) and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).”  
 
In the Wellington example, COGCC permitted percolation pits are used for 
aquifer recharge, but this technique may not work in all areas. Under current regulations, 
there is no mechanism for injecting high quality water (treated or otherwise) into high 
quality aquifers (which would include shallow aquifer recharge wells or even some coal 
seam reinjection). If a project like Wellington wished to inject treated water, or a CBM 
operator wanted to conduct aquifer recharge (perhaps as part of an augmentation plan) 
the current COGCC rules would not allow it. Not only would an operator require a Class 
V permit from the EPA, they would have to request a variance from the COGCC. Rather 
than subjecting aquifer recharge projects to the same problems Wellington faced, the 
COGCC should modify their rules to allow class V reinjection subject to EPA oversight. 
 
B. Economic Feasibility 
 
The Wellington oil example and the Vance case highlight the current statutory 
deficiencies in Colorado and many states in the intermountain west for encouraging 
sustainable practices and beneficial use of produced waters. At a produced waters 
workshop held at Colorado State University in February 2007, the owner of the 
Wellington oilfield doubted that he would have undertaken the project if he would have 
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fully understood its complexities.263 If a highly profitable and arguably desirable project 
that will produce marketable water for 300 to 500 years264 is viewed with some degree of 
regret by its founder, why would CBM producers, whose wells may produce decreasing 
amounts of  water for only 10 years ever undertake similar projects (or even hope to 
recoup their costs)? As shown in part III, the answer lies in the economics; statutory 
changes should decrease the costs of desirable projects for oil and gas producers, as well 
as increase the burden on producers who would waste high quality water. With the proper 
economic incentives in place, both producers and other stakeholders will come to see 
both gas and water as valuable resources, which may fuel additional conflict but will 
likely encourage efficient exploitation of both resources.  
Let us examine how the proposed statutory scheme outlined so far would treat three 
different operators: (1) a conventional oil and gas operator who will reinject his produced 
water; (2) the Wellington oilfield owner; (3) CBM producers in statutory non-tributary 
areas; and (4) CBM operators in tributary areas. 
 Because conventional oil and gas extraction does not constitute beneficial use, the 
SEO would have no jurisdiction and conventional producers would continue to dispose of 
their produced water through reinjection or other means according to COGCC rule 907 
with single agency oversight.265 Nothing would change for these producers. If, however, 
conventional producers wished to treat and beneficially use the produced water, as in the 
Wellington field, their capital costs and start up time would be reduced significantly. 
They could show that their produced water was non-tributary without extensive 
                                                 
263 Brad Pomeroy stated that “[i]f I’d known then what I know now, I’d have realized we probably can’t, 
but we’re way too far down the road [now]. . . .” 
264 See Cherry Sokoloski, Udall Bill could Help Oil-Rich, Water-Poor West, NORTH FORTY NEWS, April, 
2007, available at http://www.northfortynews.com/Archive/A200704UdallBill.htm. 
265 See Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, supra note 102 at 907. 
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hydrologic modeling, and the SEO review would be considerably shorter. Lower capital 
costs would allow for treatment of lower quality produced water. 
 For CBM producers in statutorily defined non-tributary areas, C.R.S. 37-90-
137(7) would apply. A well permit would be required from the SEO, as well as a 
determination that dewatering would not constitute material injury to the vested rights of 
others. Presumably, the chances that pumping deep, saline water would cause injury is 
unlikely, but the inquiry would still be completed. The rate of withdrawal would be set to 
dewater the mine, and the water could then be disposed of according to COGCC rules or 
put to some beneficial use without further oversight from the SEO (state water quality 
rules would still apply to any surface discharge). If the operators wished to then obtain a 
water right in order to market the produced water, they could then apply to the water 
court using the SEO permit as the basis for the right. Because of basin geology, this 
would cover most CBM operators in Colorado, especially in the Piceance and San Juan 
Basins. 
 CBM operators in tributary areas (such as the Raton Basin and near the Fruitland 
outcrop of the San Juan) would be on equal footing with traditional appropriators. Unless 
they could meet the statutory exemption, or prove by modeling that their dewatering was 
in fact non-tributary, they would require a well permit from the SEO, but in fully 
appropriated basins (most of Colorado), this permit would not issue without a plan for 
augmentation. Augmentation plans may only be approved by the water court in 
conjunction with a water right proceeding, so in order to dewater mines the operators 
would need an approved augmentation plan and a water right in the produced water.  
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This plan would slow CBM development and would involve extensive additional 
permitting from the SEO. The proposed legislation would cause direct economic impact 
to CBM producers in Colorado, which would not be borne uniformly across basins. 
Production in the Raton Basin, which is almost exclusively tributary266 (even using the 
proposed delineation) would be significantly impacted. Producers in the Piceance Basin 
(where water is of low quality and relatively deep), however, would not be significantly 
affected. This outcome makes sense when viewed in a cost internalization model. In the 
Raton Basin, 16,000 acre-feet of water is produced each year, causing 2,500 acre-feet of 
depletions to the stream system.267 In the Piceance, however, 1,200 acre-feet of 
production resulted in less than 1 acre-foot of depletion (cumulative to date). Further, 
some wells, especially if completed improperly,268 produce large amounts of water and 
small amounts of gas. Wyoming has moved to curtail these types of wells under their 
waste statutes and by introducing a upper limit water to gas ratio.269 Under the above 
statute, however, an upper limit ratio would not be required, as these wells would be very 
costly to permit in tributary areas and may be capped voluntarily, without the SEO 
resorting to Colorado’s waste prevention statutes.270 The net result again would be 
preservation of shallow high quality water and little change in deep saline water 
extraction. 
Indirect benefits may include increased treatment, especially in tributary areas, due to 
the fact that augmentation water sources would be required. Initially, this water may 
                                                 
266 See Wolfe interview, supra note 34. 
267 See Wolfe, supra note 249. 
268 Improper casing or fracturing allows water from shallow aquifers to enter the wellbore, increasing water 
production and precluding pressure relief which in turn causes low methane yields. 
269 See Wyoming State Engineer’s Office, supra note 191. 
270 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-502(2)(a) (2007). 
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come from the dewatering itself, which would likely require some treatment. In the San 
Juan Basin, for instance, this would decrease the use of class II reinjection in favor of 
traditional beneficial uses. 
In Colorado, the instances where CBM producers have a right to their produced 
water is relatively clear and would not require statutory changes. The statutory proposal 
outlined above does not clarify rights but rather “forces” rights. All CBM producers 
would require a water well permit and cannot cause material injury with their pumping. 
Tributary operators would already have gained water rights in their produced water,271 
and non-tributary operators would only need to apply to a water court to perfect their 
rights. Because “rights forcing” statutes place produced water inside the appropriation 
system (which in Colorado allows for sale and transfer) the value of produced water to 
the producer may increase, which in turn may increase incentives for treatment, 
beneficial use, and marketing of the water as an asset.272  
 
C. The Political Feasibility of Coalbed Methane Produced Water Legislation 
 
Politically, these statutory changes can be characterized as a sort of trade: CBM 
producers would be subject to additional regulation in exchange for more defined water 
rights. Because of the scarcity and high value of water rights in the arid West, this 
exchange has merit, but water rights are not valued the same by all stakeholders. CBM 
producers generally do not see water rights as a valuable resource, and it may be difficult 
to convince them that gaining those rights would be a fair exchange for additional water 
                                                 
271 Through the augmentation plan approval. 
272 See Bryner, supra note 243, at 555-57. 
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management regulation.273 Ranchers or other parties that would generally support more 
stringent water management legislation might react negatively to granting CBM 
producers water rights over produced waters, even to encourage beneficial use of these 
waters.274 However, legislators could reframe the argument, offering CBM producers 
partial relief from a possible (and costly) Vance affirmation, while at the same time 
offering ranchers protection of their water rights statewide. Equitably, some Industry 
concessions make sense after the rules are changed: prior to Vance (or its proposed 
codification) CBM producers were unable to gain water rights in their produced water if 
they did not find subsequent beneficial uses apart from the initial dewatering. Meanwhile, 
most basins in Colorado had become fully appropriated, leaving producers with 
extremely junior water rights and increasingly expensive augmentation sources. 
Constitutional concerns of the proposed legislation are minor. As mentioned 
earlier, the legislature has a plausible constitutional basis to pass legislation on the 
subject. Further, the Constitution states that “[t]he right to divert the unappropriated 
waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied.”275 Non-tributary 
groundwater is not part of the “natural stream” and thus outside constitutional water 
provisions. Landowners could argue that some waters falling under the statutory non-
tributary exemption were in fact tributary, and hence part of the “natural stream.”276 
Because the CBM operators would be making these waters unavailable, the landowners 
                                                 
273 Ken Wonstolen, General Counsel and Senior Vice President of the Colorado Oil and Gas Association 
states “CBM producers . . . are not interested in obtaining water rights.  They would just like to be able to 
surface discharge and let the stream administration system take it from there.” Email from Ken Wonstolen, 
to author (Nov. 26, 2007 14:08:00 EST) (on file with author). 
274 Although CBM producers place little value on water rights, that perception is not shared by most 
western state residents. JoAnn Blehm, a resident near the Wellington oilfield was asked to sign over rights 
in her nontributary water in exchange for part of the Wellington’s profits. “That’s a joke,” she said. “If I 
had my choice between gold and water, I'd take water.” See Sokoloski supra note 177. 
275 Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6. 
276 Id.  
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would be “denied” from diverting the waters. This argument fails for two reasons. First, 
if appropriation of water from a stream was “denying” later users the right to use it, the 
entire prior appropriation system would be unconstitutional. Second, if the denial by 
appropriation injured existing, vested rights, the dewatering would not be approved by 




Coalbed methane reserves are extensive in the intermountain west and are an 
important part of the United States’ energy supply. Extraction of these reserves produces 
great amounts of high quality water that is typically injected into deep, saline formations 
or dumped on the ground surface. Unlike water produced in conventional oil and gas 
operations, CBM water is often of high quality and may come from shallow formations. 
Statutes written in the 1950s to deal with conventional oil and gas production waste are 
inadequate to address CBM specific concerns, including the loss of water resource value 
and the protection of vested water rights. While each state has a different method of 
addressing CBM produced water, none has effectively solved the problem. In Colorado, 
the Vance case and the Wellington oilfield example have highlighted the issue, and the 
legislature will likely pass legislation soon. Based on a comprehensive economic analyses 
and a detailed examination of Colorado water law, the best solution for the state would be 
to declare CBM extraction a beneficial use, subjecting CBM operators to State Engineer 
jurisdiction and protecting existing water rights holders. At the same time, relaxed 
permitting standards for deep, low quality CBM dewatering would recognize that much 
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of the produced water is a liability rather than a resource. This compromise strikes the 
appropriate balance between gas extraction, existing water rights, and water resource 
preservation. Other states in the region may then use Colorado as a model for their own 
regulation, increasing the opportunity for treatment and traditional beneficial use of an 
increasingly scarce resource in the intermountain west.  
